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Abstract 
In the past decade, electronic negotiation has become an important research topic in the field of 
information systems.  A desirable goal of negotiation agents is to understand their owners’ 
requirements, and to learn their opponents’ behavior, thereby lessening the involvement of 
human beings.  Studies on human negotiation bring out that several issues can affect a human’s 
negotiation behavior, including learning an opponent’s behavior, exerting power on an opponent, 
and setting an individual goal to improve the level of accomplishment.  Research on 
incorporating these issues into negotiation agents is, however, still at an infancy state.  We 
therefore take up this topic in this thesis.   
 
Researchers have proposed many different negotiation agents that follow a preset behavior based 
on human models of negotiation.  In this thesis, we consider one such model, known as the time-
dependent-tactical model, which is used by human negotiators and in which the values of the 
negotiating issues are determined based on the time elapsed in the negotiation.  A learning 
mechanism for this model might be beneficial, because this model is frequently used in 
electronic negotiation.  Thus, we propose heuristic algorithms that estimate the parameters of an 
agent’s time-dependent-tactical model, and that then react to the estimated parameters for 
achieving higher negotiation performance.   Besides learning, we incorporate two other factors 
that have been found to affect a human negotiation outcome.  These are situational power, which 
represents differences in negotiators’ status based on market conditions, and goal constraints, 
which stand for the levels of accomplishment negotiators try to strive for.  To validate the 
impacts of learning, situational power and goal constraints in electronic negotiation, we first 
present how to integrate these features into negotiation agents, and then conduct simulations.  
With 187,500 simulation runs, we observe that our learning algorithms are effective in 
improving both individual and dyadic negotiation performances.  For the effects of situational 
power and goal constraints, we obtain congruent results between human and electronic 
negotiations.  By incorporating learning into situational power and goal constraints, we achieve 
significant joint effect between learning and situational power as well as that between learning 
and goal constraints. 
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In summary, this thesis provides three primary contributions to the fields of information systems 
and electronic-commerce research.  First, we have designed algorithms for learning an 
opponent’s negotiation behavior.  Second, our learning algorithms are found to be effective in 
improving negotiation performance.  Third, we have shown how learning can be integrated with 
situational power and goal constraints, although this is not a major focus in this study.  Finally, 
the agreement on the joint effects of learning, situational power and goal constraints between 
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Electronic agents are becoming an increasingly important research topic in the field of 
information systems.  An electronic agent is a software program that represents its owner to 
perform specific tasks.  To do this, it needs to be autonomous, reactive and proactive (Jennings, 
2001).  Agents come in different types.  Information-filtering agents, motivated by the 
information explosion on the Internet, help users to gather and filter information about a chosen 
topic.  Shopping agents assist users to shop online, by providing information, explanation, and 
recommendation to users who lack knowledge on their interested products (Murugesan, 1998).  
In addition, with the rapid development of electronic commerce, there are agents that help 
organizations and people in conducting negotiations (Ye et al., 2001). The focus of this thesis is 
on negotiation agents. 
 
Negotiation agents act on behalf of customers or sellers and negotiate with other agents on 
several issues such as the price and the delivery time of a product.  The motivation for 
negotiation agents stems from the fact that human negotiation is slow and complex, and makes 
negotiations inefficient (Murugesan, 2000; Choi et al., 2001).  As a typical negotiation involves 
multiple issues, the process of attaining an optimal outcome for all parties is comparatively 
complex.  Thus, achieving the optimal outcome becomes difficult for human negotiators (Raiffa, 
1982, Pruitt, 1981), and human negotiators often end up with a sub-optimal outcome.  This 
induces an increasing need for an electronic negotiation agent that can provide a higher level of 
information-processing capabilities (Lim & Benbasat, 1993). 
 
Since negotiation agents are ultimately meant to complement and aid human negotiation, a 
desirable element of such an agent is to understand its owner’s preferences, and to learn its 
opponents’ negotiation behavior (Choi et al., 2001).  Motivated by this goal, researchers have 
proposed many different behavioral negotiation agents that attempt to follow preset models 
drawn from human negotiation.  One of these models is time-dependent-tactical model, by which 
agents determine the values of negotiating issues based on the time elapsed in the negotiation.  
Previous research in human negotiation point out that several issues such as learning and 
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psychological factors can affect a human’s negotiation behavior.  Psychologists have determined 
that a negotiator’s demands can depend on the concession he/she expects from other parties 
(Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982).  Thus, if agents can learn and understand the time-dependent 
negotiation behavior of their opponents, they might improve their negotiation performance by 
adjusting their own negotiation models. It is, however, the case that research on incorporating 
learning mechanisms into electronic negotiation is still at a preliminary stage. 
 
In addition, psychologists have determined that situational power and goal constraints can affect 
a human’s negotiation behavior.  Situational power represents the differences in negotiators’ 
status according to the market conditions.  Negotiators who see themselves as powerful usually 
extract a large concession from their opponents, and make small concession of their own (Pruitt, 
1981; Rubin and Brown, 1975).  Goal constraints stand for the levels of accomplishment 
negotiators try to strive for.  With more difficult goals, negotiators have higher motivation, and 
thus work harder to satisfy their goals (Locke et al., 1981).  Integration of these two elements has 
already been put forth in Sundarraj (2002), but the effects of these two factors on the level of 
agreement between human and electronic negotiations have not been validated yet.  This 
validation is important because it evaluates the extent to which the integration mechanisms are 
useful in electronic negotiation tasks. 
 
To close the gaps outlined above, we do the following. 
1) We design algorithms for learning an opponent’s negotiation behavior, with the time-
dependent tactic as the basis. 
2) We integrate situational power and goal constraints into negotiation agents.  Since the 
fundamental idea of this integration stems from Sundarraj (2002), we treat this objective 
as a minor one.  We adapt from his design and further modify the integration 
methodologies. 
3) We conduct experiments to test the effectiveness of the learning algorithms, and the 




To fulfill the first objective given above, we develop learning algorithms to estimate the 
parameters of an agent’s time-dependent-tactical model.  Our algorithms consist of three phases: 
1) Preprocessing Phase, 2) Construction Phase, and 3) Improvement Phase.  In these phases, we 
progressively reduce the enumeration range for estimating the parameters, and fine-tune the 
parameters to fit the received offers.  In the preprocessing phase, we use an agent’s initial 
demand level to construct a third-degree Taylor’s series approximation of the negotiation 
function.  Based on the Taylor series, we estimate the agent’s concession rate, and use it to 
determine the type of concession behavior.  In the construction phase, we use the received offers, 
the estimated concession rates from the preprocessing phase, the time-dependent tactic equation, 
and its derivatives’ expressions to find a reference set of values for the parameters of the time-
dependent tactic.  In the improvement phase, we carry out enumeration over a discretized range 
of parameter values based on the reference set of values from the construction phase.  The 
estimated parameters are then used to adjust the agent’s own tactic, so that higher negotiation 
performance can be achieved. 
 
For our second objective, the situational power of an agent is defined as its perception about the 
preferences of potential buyers in the market for the product in question.  Situational power is 
manipulated using the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) method.  This use of AHP is similar to 
the application of AHP in benchmarking the performance of an organization (Forman & Gass, 
2001).  Specifically, by eliciting an agent’s perception of the market preferences using pairwise 
comparisons of the product’s attributes and then comparing these preferences with a neutral set 
of preferences, we can obtain a measure of an agent’s perceived power.  We then use this 
measure of power to adjust the agent’s negotiation model.  To manipulate goal, we allow users to 
specify threshold utility values that must be achieved before concluding the negotiations. 
 
Finally, to test the effect of our manipulation on electronic negotiation, we conduct two sets of 
experiments.  The first set consists of 33,750 negotiation simulations, with three levels of 
perceived power and the type of the agent (buyer or seller) as two factors.  For the effect of goal 
constraints, we carry out 60,000 simulations, with four levels of goal and the agent type as the 
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two factors.  Both these experiments are run with and without learning, and statistically analyzed 
using a range of individual and dyadic performance measures from the literature. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, we review the models that have been used in 
electronic negotiations, and present how our work is different from these studies.  In Chapter 3, 
we identify the concepts and the significance of time-dependent tactic, and present how agents 
can employ this tactic to negotiate.  Then we discuss the concept of our heuristic algorithms for 
learning in Chapter 4, and in Chapter 5, we describe the experiment for assessing the extent to 
which the algorithms can estimate the parameters of time-dependent tactic.  In Chapter 6, we 
introduce how to integrate situational power, goal constraints as well as learning into negotiation 
agents.  Subsequently, in Chapter 7, we propose the hypotheses of the effects of situational 
power, goal constraints and learning on electronic negotiation, and address the experimental 
design.  The results and discussion for the power-setting and goal-setting experiments are 
presented in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively.  Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion of the major 




2 Literature Review 
 
The rapid expansion of electronic commerce in the past decade has been the motivation for many 
studies focusing on automated negotiation agents.  These agents can ensure speed and 
consistency, mitigate the effects of human error, and offer all-time availability for global e-
business market (Murugesan, 2000).  In this chapter, our purpose is to review previous studies on 
electronic negotiations, and present our contributions in the context of these studies. 
 
First, we discuss the definition of negotiation in detail in §2.1.  In §2.2, we review current 
research on electronic negotiation.  Finally, we present our contributions in §2.3. 
 
2.1 Definition of Negotiation 
Negotiation is a complex iterative process, and is common in many different fields such as 
business and politics.  It can simply represent the purchase of an item between a buyer and a 
seller in a business transaction, or a peace negotiation agreement between two opposing parties.  
According to Pruitt (1981), “Negotiation is a process by which a joint decision is made by two or 
more parties.  The parties first verbalize contradictory demands and then move toward 
agreement by a process of concession making or search for new alternatives”.  Negotiation can 
also be defined as a process of searching a feasible alternative to resolve conflict between parties 
(Choi et al., 2001).  Basically, negotiation is a process to reach an agreement between two or 
more parties on certain terms such as price and quantity.  One party proposes an offer, while 
another party evaluates and decides whether to accept or reject the offer.  If the party rejects, it 
may propose a counter offer.  This process is iterated until both parties compromise for an 
agreement, or either party terminates the negotiation. 
 
Negotiation can be classified as distributive or integrative bargaining (Goh et al., 2000; Teich et 
al., 1999).  In distributive bargaining, two parties bargain over a fixed pie.  Both parties have 
high interest in the same issue, and thus create a high conflict.  On the other hand, in integrative 
bargaining, two parties expand the pie when they have interests in different issues.  Under this 
situation, conflict is reduced, and both individual and dyadic performances increase.  One 
example to present the difference between distributive and integrative bargaining is the division 
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of a glass of apple juice and a glass of orange juice between two persons.  If person A likes to 
drink apple juice while person B likes to drink orange juice, each person receives a half glass of 
each type of juice in distributive bargaining.  On the other hand, in integrative bargaining, person 
A chooses to have all apple juice while person B chooses to have all orange juice. 
 
2.2 Research into Electronic Negotiation 
Although research on automated negotiation agents is still at a preliminary stage, extensive 
research on negotiation has been done using both game theory and behavioral approaches.  Our 
discussion below focuses on how previous work in these two fields has been incorporated into 
electronic negotiation. 
 
2.2.1 Game Theory Approach 
Negotiation was treated as a bargaining game in early 1950s.  The most famous one is two-
person game, which can be classified into three categories: (1) pure conflict game, (2) pure 
coordination game, and (3) mixed-motive game (Tedeschi et al., 1973).  A pure conflict game 
exists when two parties have negatively correlated payoffs, while a pure coordination game 
exists when two parties have positively correlated payoffs.  In a mixed-motive game, both 
conflict and coordination situations are present.  This is similar to the concept of distributive 
versus integrative bargaining.  Negotiation is characterized as a non-zero sum two-person game.   
 
An aspect of game theory, which has gained strong empirical support and which has been widely 
applied in electronic negotiation, is the Nash solution (Nash, 1950; Nash 1953).  Its significance 
in negotiation stems from the observation that it can be used to predict the outcome of a 
negotiation (Neslin & Greenhalgh, 1983; Eliashberg et al., 1986) and to test the fairness of a 
negotiation outcome.  In many studies on electronic negotiation, the Nash solution has been used 
as a performance measure to validate the fairness of negotiation agreements (Zeng & Sycara, 
1998; Goh et al., 2000) 
 
Although a game theory approach seems to be a feasible method to study negotiation, it has 
several limitations.  First of all, the game theory approach often focuses on outcome rather than 
process (Lim & Benbasat, 1993; Goh et al., 2000; Zeng & Sycara, 1998).  Second, game 
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theorists are interested in how a player should behave to be smarter, while researchers are 
interested in how a player actually behave during the process (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Raiffa, 
1982).  Thus, game-theory models are inadequate for research into understanding a negotiator’s 
behavior during a negotiation process.  Third, the number of players and their identities are fixed 
and known to everyone in game theory model.  Also, all players are assumed to be rational, and 
their utility functions are disclosed (Zeng & Sycara, 1998).  These assumptions might limit game 
theory’s applicability to behaviorally-based negotiation. 
 
2.2.2 Behaviorally-Driven Approach 
To have autonomous negotiation, a negotiation model becomes a central component in electronic 
negotiation.  A negotiation model is a set of rules or functions that agents follow to evaluate 
offers and make counter offers.  A negotiation model that has been frequently employed is the 
time-dependent-tactical model, by which agents determine the values of the negotiating issues 
based on the time that has elapsed since the beginning of the negotiation.  An example of 
negotiation agent employing this model is MIT’s Kasbah (Kasbah, 1999).  Here, agents negotiate 
with one another over the price of a product using one of the three time-decay functions: linear, 
quadratic or exponential (Guttman et al., 1998). 
 
However, when a negotiation involves multiple issues, it might become integrative because users 
might interest in different issues.  To capture users’ preferences on different negotiating issues, 
agents require utility functions to determine how much they like each received offer (Guttman et 
al., 1998) and then to make counter offers by choosing the strategies that maximize the utilities.  
One utility function suggested by Sim & Chan (2000) is a linear combination formulation of the 
multi attribute utility theory (MAUT), which consists of the user-specified weight of each 
negotiating issue and the utility of each negotiating issue.  The weights represent the importance 
levels of the issues to the users, and the utilities stand for the scores of the issues for the values in 
question.  If a user has a higher concern on price than on delivery time, a higher weight is placed 
on price than delivery time.  Another function suggested by Choi et al. (2001) differs from 
MAUT, in that the user-specified weight is the power term of the utility of each negotiating 
issue, and the overall utility is the cumulative product rather than the cumulative sum of the 
utilities of the negotiating issues.  Among the studies we surveyed, the use of AHP for utility 
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computation is, however, still absent.  Since a negotiation process often involves multiple issues 
and multiple alternatives, and since AHP can be applied in selecting among competing 
alternatives in a multi-objective environment (Forman and Gass, 2001), we integrate AHP into 
the utility computation of negotiation agents. 
 
Another gap in the behavioral approach to electronic negotiation is a lack of psychological 
elements.  In human negotiation, two psychological factors that have been frequently studied are 
situational power and goal constraints.  Psychologists have suggested that these two factors can 
affect a human’s negotiation behavior (Pruitt, 1981; Rubin & Brown, 1975), and have tested 
their impacts on human negotiation outcome (Dwyer & Walker, 1981; McAlister et al., 1986; 
Pinkley et al., 1994; Huber & Neale, 1986; Bazerman et al., 1985; Hamner & Harnett, 1974).  
However, research on incorporating situational power and goal constraints into negotiation 
agents is still at a preliminary stage. 
 
2.2.3 Other Approaches 
Besides game theory and behaviorally-driven approaches, learning an opponent’s negotiation 
behavior has become another research direction in electronic negotiation.  The forecast of an 
opponent’s future concession might be used as a guideline for deciding a negotiator’s upcoming 
move  (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982).  This phenomenon is called tracking, and one way to 
implement it is through learning.  Zeng & Sycara (1998) indicated that learning is beneficial for 
negotiation agents, because agents can achieve higher profits or utilities.  Recently, two learning 
algorithms have been proposed for negotiation agents: (1) genetic algorithms, and (2) Bayesian 
learning. 
 
A genetic algorithm is an evolutionary approach, in which high-performance negotiation tactics 
from parent agents are adapted to child agents, while low-performance tactics are removed.  In 
the beginning, parent agents start with a population of negotiation tactics, and employ these 
tactics against other parent agents in negotiations.  At the end of a negotiation, the performance 
of each tactic is evaluated.  After evaluation, the tactics with high performance are integrated 
with other high-performance tactics, and are adapted to the child agents (Deveaux et al., 2001; 
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Tu et al., 2000).  These crossed-over tactics of child agents are expected to outperform their 
parents’. 
 
In Bayesian learning, each agent has some knowledge and belief about several aspects of a 
negotiation.  These include the environmental or market situation, belief of opponents’ 
negotiation tactics, and belief of opponents’ utility functions.  Moreover, before a negotiation 
starts, each agent has a subjective probability of each of this belief or knowledge.  As the 
negotiation proceeds, these subjective probabilities are adjusted according to the received offers.  
With these updated subjective probabilities, agents make counter offers by following Bayesian 
decision-making rules (Zeng & Sycara, 1998). 
 
Both genetic algorithms and Bayesian learning have limitations.  To employ genetic algorithms, 
several trials have to be conducted before obtaining the child generation tactics (Deveaux et al., 
2001).  In Bayesian learning, agents need to have prior knowledge before a negotiation starts.  
Thus, when agents are new to each other in a negotiation, both learning approaches may not be 
successful. 
 
2.3 Our Contribution 
In this thesis, our goal is to make negotiation agents to be more human-like, so that they can 
represent their owners in negotiations.  To aid in this goal, we integrate learning and two 
psychological factors, namely situational power and goal constraints, into negotiation agents, and 
conduct experiments to test whether there is congruence of outcome between human and 
electronic negotiations. 
 
In learning, we have observed that genetic algorithms and Bayesian learning have limited 
applicability when agents are new to each other in a negotiation.  This is very important because 
there are numerous negotiation agents in the Internet, and agents might not have negotiation 
experience with each of their opponents.  As a result, with incomplete information about an 
opponent, it is crucial to use the received offers in an established negotiation as a guideline for 
learning.  Furthermore, among our reviewed studies, a learning algorithm for the time-
dependent-tactical model is not available.  Therefore, in this thesis, we introduce how we can use 
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an agent’s initial demand levels and concession rate for learning the time-dependent-tactical 
model’s parameters. 
 
As for situational power, we first find that the integration of this factor into electronic negotiation 
is missing.  Second, our manipulation of situational power is also different from those in 
previous psychological studies.  Instead of varying a negotiator’s BATNA (Best Alternative to 
The Negotiated Agreement) (Pinkley et al., 1994), or varying the number of buyers and sellers in 
the market (McAlister et al., 1986; Dwyer & Walker, 1981), we use the idea of AHP’s 
applicability in benchmarking an organization’s performance (Forman & Gass, 2001) to model 
situational power.  We make comparisons between the perceived market preferences of a product 
that buyers are interested in and a neutral preference, and use the difference to represent the level 
of power.  Similarly, the incorporation of goal constraints into negotiation agents is absent, and 
our manipulation of goal constraints differs from those in previous psychological studies.  Rather 
than telling a negotiator not to accept any transactions that do not meet the minimum profit 
requirements, we allow users to specify threshold utility values that agents must achieve before 
concluding the negotiations. 
 
Finally, in the studies that we surveyed, we observe that the effects of situational power and goal 
constraints on electronic negotiation have not been tested.  To address this, hypotheses tested in 
human negotiation are taken up for validation in the electronic setting.  The goal here is not to 




3 Time-Dependent Negotiation Tactic 
 
In chapter 2, we reviewed numerous studies on electronic negotiation, and the gaps associated 
with it.  We have also presented our contributions in the context of those studies.  In the past 
decade, we observe that many different electronic negotiation agents such as MIT Media Lab’s 
Kasbah (Kasbah, 1999), and MIT Media Lab’s Impulse (Impulse, 1999), have been proposed 
and applied in electronic-commerce business.   
 
With so many negotiation agents, Deveaux et al. (2001) have classified negotiation agents as 
either optimizing agents or behavioral negotiation agents.  The objective of optimizing agents is 
to maximize their negotiation profits based on their beliefs of the market structure, and the 
expected behavior of their opponents.  Thus, they do not follow certain preset models to 
negotiate.  On the other hand, behavioral negotiation agents have an element called the type of 
behavior.  With differences in the types of behavior, some agents like to make small changes in 
their initial offers, but concede quickly when approaching their time limits.  In contrast, a few 
agents prefer to concede quickly at the beginning and stay firm at the end.  In another case, some 
agents just keep changing their offers by a fixed amount along the negotiations.  To capture these 
behaviors, behavioral negotiation agents employ preset negotiation protocols to decide how to 
reach concession or no-concession.  Based on their negotiation models, behavioral negotiation 
agents follow their tactics to negotiate, until they reach their time limits or reservation values (the 
negotiating issues’ thresholds at which negotiators would not go beyond).   
 
In this thesis, we focus on behavioral negotiation agents, and how they can employ their 
negotiation models to negotiate.  A negotiation model is a set of rules that negotiation agents 
follow to make offers or counter-offers.  A negotiation tactic, which is a set of functions for 
agents to determine the values of the negotiating issues based on a single criterion (Matos et al., 
1998), is a major component of the negotiation model.   
 
In the past few years, many different negotiation tactics have been proposed.  Faratin et al. 
(1997) have identified the resource-dependent tactic, which generates offers based on the 
consumption pattern of resources during negotiation.  When there are fewer resources, agents are 
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more eager to complete the negotiations.  On the other hand, the more the resources, the lower 
the pressure, and hence, agents are less urgent to reach agreements.  Axelrod (1984) has 
introduced the behavior-dependent tactic, which generates offer according to opponents’ 
previous attitudes.  Negotiators simply imitate the behavior of their opponents for their next 
moves.  Zacharia et al., (2001) have also proposed a dynamic pricing algorithm, in which agents 
update the reputation of their counterparts in a collaborative fashion, and make offers based on 
these reputation values.  Among these negotiation tactics, the one that has been frequently 
studied is the time-dependent tactic (Guttman et al., 1998; Deveaux et al., 2001; Faratin et al., 
1997; Matos et al., 1998).  With this tactic, agents treat time as the predominant factor, and 
determine the values of the negotiating issues in line with time pressure.  In this chapter, we 
discuss the characteristics and the importance of this tactic. 
 
3.1 Framework of Time-Dependent Tactic 
The amount of time that has elapsed since the beginning of a negotiation creates time pressure, 
which forces negotiators to reach agreements quickly.  Two effects of time pressure are lower 
demands and faster concessions (Pruitt, 1981).  Since negotiators want to end the negotiations 
quickly, they have to sacrifice by accepting deals that are more favorable to their opponents.  
Rubin and Brown (1975) also stated that time pressure can cause greater or more frequent 
concessions.  On the other hand, as negotiators are willing to wait longer and to appear less eager 
for reaching agreements, they achieve higher profits (Raiffa, 1982).   
 
Pruitt (1981) and Raiffa (1982) have identified two types of time-dependent negotiation 
behavior, namely Boulware and Conceder.  A negotiator with boulware behavior stays firm at 
the beginning of a negotiation, and concedes when approaching the time limit.  When a 
negotiator starts with firmness, there is sufficient room to move, and the reservation value can be 
protected.  In addition, a negotiator with boulware behavior can avoid position loss, which is the 
desertion of a desirable alternative, and also avoid image loss, which is a lack of firmness 
developed in other people’s eyes.  Position loss is a concern, because a negotiator has difficulty 
to withdraw a concession once made.  Image loss is another concern, because once a negotiator 
concedes, it might inspire the opponent to maintain high demand.  Negotiators with weak needs 
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for agreements often exhibit boulware behavior, because they have less to lose by failure to reach 
agreements. 
 
A negotiator with conceder behavior concedes his/her reservation values quickly at the beginning 
of a negotiation, and their concession rates become flattened as approaching the time limits.  One 
reason for this behavior is to encourage the other parties to remain in the negotiation process so 
that agreements are more likely reached.  Negotiators with strong needs for agreements usually 
exhibit conceder behavior, because they have more to lose if they fail to make agreements. 
 
Based on the above concepts, Faratin et al. (1997) and Deveaux et al. (2001) have identified the 














































  If V is increasing  (3.2) 
 
where    t is time (number of turn) in the interval [0, maxT ] 
( )tP  is the value of the negotiating issue proposed by an agent at time t 
minP  is the minimum value of the negotiating issue 
maxP  is the maximum value of the negotiating issue 
K  is a constant that determines the value of the negotiating issue in the first offer.   
K ∈  (0, 1) 
maxT  is the time limit (maximum number of turn) proposed by an agent 
V  is the utility function of the negotiating issue 
β is a constant that determines the degree of convexity  
 
To simplify our further analysis, we assume that an increase in the value of an issue decreases a 
buyer’s utility, but increases a seller’s utility.  Under this assumption, equations (3.1) and (3.2) 
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represent the time-dependent tactic expressions for a buying and a selling agent, respectively.  In 
either equation, there are five major parameters, Pmin, Pmax, Tmax, β, and K, specified by the 
agent’s user.  The interval [Pmin, Pmax] represents the value range of the issue that is acceptable 
by the user.  A deadline, which is given by Tmax in (3.1) and (3.2), represents the user’s preferred 
time duration.  The value of the issue in the first offer is obtained by multiplying the constant, K, 
by the interval [Pmin, Pmax].  The higher the value of K, the further the value of the issue in the 
first offer from the starting value.  In addition, K ∈  (0, 1) so that the value of the issue is always 
within the interval [Pmin, Pmax].   
 
The parameter, β, is the degree of convexity that determines the type of behavior of the time-
dependent tactic.  The next section discusses how β can be changed to simulate different 
behavior. 
 
3.2 Importance of Time-Dependent Tactic 
We focus on time-dependent tactic in this thesis because of its similarity to human behavior, and 
its applicability in electronic negotiation. 
 
3.2.1 Similarity to Human’s Negotiation Behavior 
As discussed in §3.1, time often has an impact on a negotiator’s concession level.  The 
mathematical model of the time-dependent tactic introduced in §3.1 can exhibit the effect of time 
pressure on a human’s negotiation behavior. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the mathematical expression (3.1) with different values of β.  It also shows the 
effect of β on the negotiation behavior of a buyer, when price is treated as the negotiating issue.  
Boulware behavior is exhibited when β < 1.  The concession rate remains low until time is 
almost exhausted, where the value of the issue is conceded up to the reservation value.  This is 
consistent with the thoughts from Raiffa (1982) and Pruitt (1981).  The buyer makes lower initial 
demands, but faster concessions when approaching the time limit. 
   
When β > 1, we observe conceder behavior from Figure 3.1.  The concession rate is high at the 
beginning, but becomes low as the deadline approaches.  This is similar to Pruitt’s unilateral 
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concession model, which is to concede unilaterally to reduce the distance between two parties’ 
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Figure 3.1. Effect of β on Time-Dependent Tactic 
 
3.2.2 Applicability in Electronic Negotiation  
Due to its resemblance to the human’s negotiation behavior, the time-dependent tactic has been 
employed in many electronic negotiation agents such as Kasbah from MIT Media Lab (Kasbah, 
1999; Guttman et al., 1998).  Kasbah provides buyers with one of three negotiation behaviors: 
anxious, coolheaded, and frugal – corresponding to a linear, quadratic or exponential function, 
respectively for increasing the price offers over time. 
 
Moreover, numerous studies in electronic negotiation were conducted by employing the time-
dependent tactic.  Deveaux et al. (2001) used the time-dependent tactic in their experiments to 
test if an agent can achieve better performance by adapting its negotiation tactic to the behavior 
of its opponent.  They employed both the conceder and the boulware behaviors in their analysis.  
 
Faratin et al. (1997) also conducted several experiments to empirically test the applicability of 
the time-dependent tactic by allowing agents with boulware (β < 1), conceder (β > 1) and linear 
(β = 1) behaviors to negotiate with one another.  They found that as there was plenty of time 
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(high Tmax) or only short time (low Tmax) for agents to negotiate, agents with linear behavior 
outperformed those with conceder and boulware behaviors.  This is analogous to the thoughts 
from Pruitt (1981) and Raiffa (1982).  As Raiffa (1982) stated, “The party that negotiates in 
haste is often at a disadvantage”.  Negotiators with conceder behavior usually reach agreements 
quickly, but they have to sacrifice by accepting deals that are more favorable to their opponents 
(Pruitt, 1981).  On the other hand, agents with boulware behavior usually fail to reach 
agreements and thus perform poorly (Raiffa, 1982; Pruitt, 1981).  For agents with linear 
behavior, they often make moderate demands and reach agreements at good levels of profit. 
 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the concept and the significance of the time-dependent tactic.  
With a correspondence to the human’s negotiation behavior and applicability to electronic 
negotiation, more agents are expected to employ the time-dependent tactic in the future.  Thus, if 
an agent can learn and understand the time-dependent tactic of its opponents, performance might 





4 Heuristics for Learning 
 
In Chapter 3, we have investigated how a behavioral negotiation agent can employ the time-
dependent tactic to negotiate.  In this chapter, we attempt to design a learning algorithm for the 
parameters of the time-dependent tactic. 
 
Learning capability is becoming an important component of a negotiation model because it can 
increase the performance a negotiation agent (Zeng & Sycara, 1998).  Learning, which is defined 
as the ability to detect an opponent’s negotiation model, might help a negotiation agent to 
improve over time.  The decision of how much to demand or concede often depends on the 
expectations about the other’s ultimate demand and concession rate (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982), 
and the results from learning could help to make up these expectations.  However, learning is 
difficult because of the scarcity of information.  Since we assume that agents are new to each 
other, the only available information to estimate an opponent’s negotiation model is the bid 
offers from the opponent in the established negotiation.  A lack of opponent’s negotiation history 
creates difficulty in learning.  This is the reason why genetic algorithms have limited 
applicability when agents lack negotiation experience of their opponents (Deveaux et al., 2001). 
 
Once the result from learning is obtained, an agent could adjust its negotiation tactic to gain 
advantage based on the prediction of an opponent’s future move.  The objective of this chapter is 
to present heuristic learning algorithms for the estimation of the parameters of the time-
dependent-tactical model.  The predictability of the learning mechanism will be tested in the next 
chapter.   
 
First of all, the difficulty of estimating the parameters of a time-dependent-tactical model is 
discussed in §4.1.  Because of this difficulty, we introduce the properties of the derivatives of the 
time-dependent-tactical model, and an estimation approach of the derivatives in §§4.2 and §4.3, 
respectively.  Then in §4.4, we present heuristic enumeration algorithms that use the derivatives’ 
properties and the derivative-estimation approach.  Based on the result from learning, an agent 
might achieve higher performance by adjusting the parameters of its negotiation model.  Thus, in 
§4.5, we present an algorithm for agents to react to the estimated parameters.  Finally, in a 
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negotiation, the number of offers that an agent receives for learning might vary.  The effect of 
this on the proposed learning algorithms is addressed in §4.6. 
 
Due to the similarity of the negotiation models between the buying and the selling agents, the 
discussion in this chapter will focus on buying agents, although it is also applicable, with 
appropriate changes, to selling agents as well. 
 
4.1 Difficulty of Estimation 
In this thesis, learning represents an agent’s ability to estimate the parameters of an opponent’s 
time-dependent-tactical model.  The estimated parameters need to closely fit the price offers.  
Previous experience with the opponent is not taken into account.  Thus, each agent is considered 
to have similar level of difficulty in each new negotiation.  In order to estimate the five 
parameters of the time-dependent-tactical model, several offers from an opponent are required 
before learning can start.  One obvious way to estimate these five parameters is regression, 
which is discussed in §4.1.1.  Another way is to use the first few price offers to analytically find 
a unique set of parameters, and this approach is addressed in §4.1.2.  Both approaches lead to 
equations that appear difficult to solve mathematically. 
 
4.1.1 Regression 
Since the time-dependent tactic equation (3.1) consists of an exponential term, we first observe 
that a straightforward application of linear regression would not be possible.  Next, we try to 
transform the negotiation model into a linear function.  Chatterjee & Price (1991) have 
introduced several transformation methods for this purpose, but equation (3.1) is not amenable to 
any of these transformations because of the Pmin term.  The last approach we consider is 
nonlinear regression (Ratkowsky, 1983).  To explain this, we write equation (3.1) as 
 

















max   
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where θ = (Pmin, Pmax, β, Tmax, K)T is the vector of parameters to be estimated, t is the number of 
turns, εt is the error term that is normally distributed with mean zero and unknown variance, and 
the sum of squares, S(θ), which is to be minimized, is given by 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]θθθθ ,,, 2 tfPtfPtfPS tTt
t
t −−=−= ∑  
After substituting f(t, θ) with a one-degree Taylor’s series polynomial, S(θ) can be differentiated 
and set to zero.  The resultant equation can then be used to iteratively estimate the parameters by 
the Gauss-Newton method.  Since there are five unknowns, we take t = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.  That is, 
θi+1, the values of parameter set at iteration i+1, is given by 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]itiTiiTii fPJJJ θθθθθθ −+= −+ 11  
 
where i represents the iteration starting from one, and the J(θi) is the 5 x 5 Jacobian matrix given 
below (the row in the matrix represents t). 
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Preliminary simulations suggest the limited applicability of nonlinear regression approach to our 
estimation problem.  First, convergence cannot be guaranteed in all cases, and is dependent on 
the initial set of estimated parameters.  When the initial set of estimated parameters is close to 
the actual values, convergence appears to increase.  Moreover, since the nonlinear regression 
method involves the use of Taylor’s series with only the first two terms, the accuracy of the 
estimated parameters is another concern, even if convergence is obtained.  Thus, we conclude 
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that the nonlinear regression approach appears to be worthwhile for conducting further tests, 
before it can be actually implemented. 
 
4.1.2 Price-Equation Algorithm 
With equation (3.1) and the five price offers from an opponent, it might be possible to 
analytically estimate the five parameters of the time-dependent-tactical model.  For example, by 
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Equation (4.3t) consists of three equations for t = 2, 3, 4 and three unknowns, β, Tmax and K.  No 
further simplification could be done.  We have tried to use the well known software, Maple 
(Kofler, 1997) to solve these equations symbolically but did not succeed.  In order to solve three 
equations simultaneously, trial and error is required. 
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4.2 Properties of Derivative 
Due to the limitations of regression and the price-equation algorithm, we look further into the 
properties of the time-dependent-tactical model.  In this model, the dependent variable is price or 
the value of the negotiating issue, while two of the independent variables are the number of turns 
and the degree of convexity, β, which determines the behavior of the agent.  The discussion 
below focuses on the properties of the derivatives of the price with respect to these two 
parameters.  The use of these properties in our algorithms is addressed in §4.4. 
 
4.2.1 Derivative with respect to the Number of Turns 
The first, second and third derivatives of the price with respect to the number of turns are shown 
in (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6), respectively. 
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1 monotonically decreases from 1 to 0 as t 
increases from 0 to Tmax. 




























for t1 < t2.  This shows the Lemma.   
 
 
Corollary 1. For K ∈  (0, 1), C2 is negative, and increases monotonically from βln(K) to 0 as t 
increases from 0 to Tmax. 
 
 
Theorem 1. The price of a buying agent increases with the number of turns. 
 
Proof Since the parameters (Pmin, Pmax, β, and Tmax) are positive, and ln(K) is negative for K ∈  
(0, 1), it follows that the term outside the bracket in equation (4.4) is positive.  From Lemma 1, 
the term inside the bracket is greater than or equal to zero. Thus, this theorem is proved.  
 
 
Lemma 2. For t ∈  [0, Tmax], C1 ≤ 0. 
Proof Similar to that for Theorem 1.  
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Theorem 2. For boulware agents, the first derivative of price with respect to the number of turns 
is always increasing. 
 






∂ ≥ 0.  
 







Proof C1 ≤ 0 by Lemma 2, and C3 > 0 for conceder agents.  Hence, if for t = 0, |C2| = |βln(K)| < 






< 0.  If not, because C2 ≤ 0 and monotonically increases to 0 by Corollary 1, there 














 < 0 in turn.  
 
4.2.2 Derivative with respect to Concession Rate 


















































Theorem 4. At every turn, the price increases with β 
. 
Proof According to Lemma 1, the first and the second terms in B1 above are positive and 
negative respectively, and hence, B1 ≤ 0.  The parameters (Pmin, Pmax, β, and Tmax) are positive, 
ln(K) is negative for K ∈  (0, 1), and B2 < 0 for all t and β.  As a result, β∂
∂P ≥ 0 for all t and β.  
 
4.3 Estimation of Derivatives 
The learning algorithms that will be proposed in §4.4 are based on the properties of the 
derivatives introduced in §4.2, and on the approach to estimate these derivatives at various turns.  
This section focuses on the latter aspect. 
 
There are two approaches for the estimation.  The first approach consists of taking the derivative 
between two turns by connecting the two price offers with a straight line.  Since the time 
difference between consecutive turns is always one, the derivative could be estimated as the 
difference between the prices.  The advantage of this method is the ease of calculation.  The 
disadvantage is the accuracy of the estimated derivative.  The time-dependent-tactical model is a 
curve, while the above approach relies on connecting two price offers with a straight line.  This 
difference makes this estimation method inaccurate. 
 
Our second approach applies the Taylor’s series for the estimation.  When the time-dependent-
tactical model is approximated by a Taylor’s series, the coefficients of the series represent the 
derivatives.    The use of Taylor’s series is similar to that in the nonlinear regression approach.  
Ratkowsky (1983) employs a first-degree Taylor’s polynomial to describe a nonlinear regression 
method, whereas we use a third-degree Taylor’s polynomial.  Later, we will explain why we 
choose third-degree polynomials.  With the mathematical tractability of the derivatives at t = 0, 
we choose to approximate the negotiation model, P(t), at t = 0, and the Taylor’s series 
polynomial is given as 
























 is the estimated price at t, ( )0P  is the actual price at t = 0, n is the number of degree 
of the polynomial, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0,0''',0'',0' nPPPP  are the various derivatives of the price with respect 














R  for 
c ∈  [0, t]. 
 
The Taylor’s series expression allows us to work with a polynomial approximation of the time-
dependent-tactical model.  Theoretically, before such an expression can be used, we need to 
determine the degree of the polynomial for which the remainder converges to zero in the limit.  
However, due to the complexity of the derivatives, we opt to employ simulation to determine the 
degree of the polynomial that must be used, rather than prove convergence mathematically. 
 
We conducted a preliminary simulation to test four different degrees of polynomials (1, 2, 3 and 
4).  Let SSE1st denotes the sum of the squared error (SSE) between the estimated first derivative 
obtained from the Taylor’s polynomial and the actual value computed by (4.4), SSE2nd means the 
SSE between the estimated second derivative from the polynomial and the actual one from (4.5), 
and SSE3rd stands for the SSE between the estimated third derivative taken from the polynomial 
and the actual third derivative from (4.6).  The three SSEs are presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. The SSE1st, SSE2nd, SSE3rd of Four Polynomial Models. 
Number of Degree of Polynomial 
Performance Measure One Two Three Four 
SSE1st  8.6072 1.1681 0.0024 0.0007 
SSE2nd  6.1124 2.4861 0.0217 0.0104 
SSE3rd  1.1135 1.1135 0.0617 0.0450 
     
SSE1st, excluding t = 0 4.1214 0.6081 0.0018 0.0004 
SSE2nd, excluding t = 0 3.7581 1.4541 0.0159 0.0038 
SSE3rd, excluding t = 0 0.9379 0.9379 0.0411 0.0144 
 
According to Table 4.1, the third-degree and the fourth-degree polynomials outperform the other 
two in three SSEs.  An example of Taylor’s polynomial fits for the first five price offers of a 
buying agent (Pmin = 100, Pmax = 250, β = 5.5, Tmax = 10, K = 0.1) is given in Figure 4.1.  As 
shown therein, all polynomials fit the price offers well.  However, according to the first 
derivative plot, the third-degree and the fourth-degree polynomials outperform the first-degree 
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and the second-degree polynomials.  Further, a t-test between the third-degree and the fourth-
degree polynomials indicates that there are insignificant differences between these two 
polynomial approximations for all the three SSEs.  Summers et al. (1977) stated that an 
appropriate rule was to select the lowest-order polynomial, when more than one polynomial with 
different degrees appeared to fit the series reasonably well.  Hence, we select the third-degree 
polynomial.  Based on our empirical experience, the third-degree polynomial fits well for a 
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Figure 4.1. Samples of Taylor’s Polynomial Fits for the First Five Price Offers.
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For our simulation, Table 4.1 reveals a pattern that for the third-degree polynomial, SSE1st is 
smaller than SSE2nd, while SSE2nd is smaller than SSE3rd.  That is, for higher-order derivatives, the 
accuracy of the estimated derivative decreases.  In addition, when the error term at t = 0 is not 
taken into account in SSE computation, we find significant decreases in three SSEs of the third-
degree polynomial.  The estimated derivatives at t = 0 are comparatively less accurate than the 
estimated derivatives at other values of t.  Finally, the simulation result is only used as a 
heuristic. 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we approximate the time-dependent-tactical model by 
 
( ) 332210 tbtbtbbtP +++=
∧




 is the estimated price at turn t, and b0, b1, b2 and b3 are the terms obtained from the 
best-fit curve.  By differentiating (4.8), we obtain: 
 
 ( ) 2321' 32 tbtbbtP ++=
∧
        (4.9) 
 ( ) tbbtP 32'' 62 +=
∧
         (4.10) 
 ( ) 3''' 6btP =
∧




' , ( )tP
∧
'' , ( )tP
∧
'''  are the estimated first, second and third derivatives at t. 
 
4.4 Algorithms 
As stated in §4.1, there is a difficulty to estimate the parameters by analytically solving the time-
dependent tactic equations.  This section introduces how we use the properties of the derivatives 
and the estimates of the derivatives to define an enumeration range.  Our heuristic learning 
algorithms consist of three phases: 1) Preprocessing Phase, 2) Construction Phase, and 3) 
Improvement Phase.  To varying degrees, these phases look for a balance between accuracy and 
tractability.  The preprocessing phase seeks to reduce the search range of β by categorizing an 
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opponent’s behavior as either boulware or conceder.  In the construction phase, a set of 





 at t = 0.  Finally, the estimated 
parameters from the construction phase can then be used as a reference for defining the search 
range in the improvement phase.  We then perform a discretized enumeration within that range to 
estimate the parameters. 
 
4.4.1 Preprocessing Phase 
The objective of the preprocessing phase is to classify whether an agent is conceder or boulware 
based on Theorems 2 and 3, and on estimating the time-dependent-tactical model using a third-
degree best-fit curve.  This classification enables us to specify the range of β in the construction 
phase. 
 
The pseudo-code of the preprocessing phase is presented in Figure 4.2.  First, a third-degree best-
fit curve, with the format of equation (4.8), is constructed based on the price offers from the 
opponent (Step 1).  After that, we compute the ( )tP
∧
'  and the ( )tP
∧
''  for t = 0 to the number of 





 decreases, the agent 





 must decrease 
for a conceder agent.  As a result, when ( )tP
∧
'  decreases at any t, the agent is said to be conceder.  
This allows us to set the search range as given in Step 3.   
 
Preprocessing Phase 
1) Construct a cubic best-fit polynomial from the price offers with the format of equation (4.8) 
2) Find the ( )tP
∧
' and ( )tP
∧
''  from t = 0 to (N-1) by equations (4.9) and (4.10) 
3) If ( ) ( )tPtP
∧∧
<+ '' 1  for same t 
  Set βlower = 1.01, since agent is conceder 
 Else 
  Set βlower = 0.01, since agent might be boulware or conceder 
 End If 
 *Note: The accuracy of β is set to 2 decimal places 
Figure 4.2. Pseudo-code of the Preprocessing Phase. 
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4.4.2 Construction Phase 
The objective of the construction phase is to find out a set of estimated parameters for reference, 
based on the derivatives of the price at t = 0.  Derivatives at t = 0 are used in the construction 
phase, because the resulting equations can be simplified.  We propose two algorithms: 1) The 
Two-Derivative Algorithm and 2) The Three-Derivative Algorithm.  The former one employs 
the first two derivatives at t = 0, while the latter one employs the first three derivatives at t = 0. 
 
4.4.2.1 The Two-Derivative Algorithm 
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T        (4.12) 
The resulting values of parameters can then be combined with (4.2) and (4.1) to evaluate Pmax 
and Pmin.  In this algorithm, several sets of parameters are obtained by enumerating over a 
discretized range of β and K.  The estimated set of parameter with the least sum of squared error 
(SSE) between the actual prices and the estimated prices is selected as the reference set.  
 
The pseudo-code of this algorithm is presented in Figure 4.3.  To perform the above 
computation, we enumerate over the feasible ranges of K and β (Steps 2a and 2b), and then find 
out Tmax, Pmin and Pmax as given in Steps 2c and 2d.  This enumeration is continued, until the SSE 
reaches a minimum and starts to increase.  The stopping criteria stems from our empirical 
experience in which we often observed the SSE first decreased before increasing (See Figure 
4.4).  Furthermore, we observed that when SSE started to increase, the previous β was the 
appropriate value for the corresponding K.  We then compare the SSE with the current minimum 
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SSE, and update the selected parameters.  On the other hand, if SSE did not start to increase at β 
= βlimit, the solutions obtained were often far from the actual values.  Hence, we do not use the 
solution (Steps 2e, 2f and 2g).  This enumeration is continued, until all values of K are processed. 
 
Construction Phase – The Two-Derivative Algorithm 
1) Initialization 
 Set ( )0'
∧
P  and ( )0''
∧
P  from preprocessing phase  
 Set Klower = 0.1 and Kupper = 0.9 
 Set βlower and βlimit from preprocessing phase 
2) Construction 
 (a) For K = Klower to Kupper with an incremental level of 0.1 
 (b)    For β = βlower to βlimit with an incremental level of 0.01 
        (c) Find Tmax by equation (4.12) 
        If Tmax > N-1 
        (d)              Estimate Pmax and Pmin by equations (4.2) and (4.1)  
                If Pmax > 0, Pmin > 0, and Pmax > Pmin,  
        (e)  Find ( )tPestimated  from t = 0 to N-1 









estimated tPtPKSSE β  
        (f)           If SSE(K, β) < SSE(K, β-0.01) and β ≥ βlimit 
 Set SSE(K) = no solution 
  ElseIf SSE(K, β) ≥ SSE(K, β-0.01) 
 Set SSE(K) = SSE(K, β-0.01) 
 Exit β loop 
  End If 
  End If 
  End If 
      Next β 
       (g)      Set ( ){ }KSSESSE minDerivative-Two =  
     Update the selected parameter set (β, Tmax, K, Pmin, Pmax)Two-Derivative corresponding to that minimum 
   Next K 
  
   























































Figure 4.4. Effect of β on the SSE for the First Five Price Offers. 
 
4.4.2.2 The Three-Derivative Algorithm 
Here we first combine the first and the third derivatives at t = 0 to obtain 



















=    (4.13) 
 
Then, when we combine (4.12), which consists of the first and the second derivatives at t = 0, 




1 =++ MMM ββ  
          
where  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )KbabaKbaM ln32ln 21 −+−+−= , ( ) ( ) ( )abKabM 23ln232 −+−= , 

































The values of a and b can be obtained by the derivatives’ estimates, as given in (4.14).  This 




















b           (4.14) 
 
As with the two-derivative algorithm, the resulting values of parameters can then be combined 
with (4.2) and (4.1) to evaluate Pmax and Pmin.  In this algorithm, several sets of parameters are 
obtained by enumerating through a defined range of K.  The estimated set of parameters with the 
least sum of squared error between the actual prices and the estimated prices is selected as the 
reference set.  
 
The pseudo-code of this algorithm is presented in Figure 4.5.  To perform the above 
computation, we enumerate over the feasible range of K (Step 2a), and then find out the 
coefficients as well as the determinant, ∆, as given in Steps 2b and 2c.  If ∆ < 0, no solution is 
possible (Step 2d).  If ∆ ≥ 0, β is found by using the quadratic formula (Step 2e).  If β is positive, 
we evaluate Tmax, Pmax, Pmin and corresponding SSE as given in Steps 2f, 2g and 2h.  After that, 












Construction Phase – The Three-Derivative Algorithm 
1) Initialization 
 Set ( )0'
∧
P  and ( )0''
∧
P  from preprocessing phase  
 Set Klower = 0.1 and Kupper = 0.9 
 Find ( )0'''
∧
P by equation (4.11) 
2) Construction 
 (a) For K = Klower to Kupper with an incremental level of 0.1 
   (b)     Find the coefficients (M1, M2 and M3) of the quadratic equation (4.14) 
   (c)    Find the determinant, ( ) 3122 4 MMM −=∆  
          If ∆ < 0 
   (d)         Set SSE(K) = no solution 
       ElseIf ∆ ≥ 0 
   (e)         Find βi by using quadratic formula (The subscript i is used to differentiate two β if ∆ > 0) 
          For each βi 
   If βi > 0 
   (f)        Find Tmax by using equation (4.12) 
         If Tmax > N-1 
   (g)   Find Pmax and Pmin by equations (4.2) and (4.1) 
    If Pmax > 0, Pmin > 0, and Pmax > Pmin 
         Find ( )tPestimated  from t = 0 to N-1 








estimated tPtPKSSE  
    End If 
         End If 
   End If 
          Next βi 
   (i)        Set ( ){ }KSSESSE minDerivative-Three =  
        Update the selected parameter set (β, Tmax, K, Pmin, Pmax)Three-Derivative corresponding to that minimum 
    End If 
       Next K 
Figure 4.5. Pseudo-code of the Construction-Phase’s Three-Derivative Algorithm. 
 
 
4.4.3 Improvement Phase 
In §4.1.2, we saw that the difficulty in estimating the parameters of the time-dependent-tactical 
model is due to the lack of a limited search range.  This problem can be mitigated by using the 
set of estimated parameters from the construction phase as a reference, and then defining a 
discretized range of parameters to search. 
 
We propose three algorithms: 1) The Price Algorithm, 2) The First-Derivative Algorithm, and 3) 
The Second-Derivative Algorithm.  These algorithms have a similar structure, but differ in the 
criteria used to guide the estimation.  The price algorithm employs the prices, while the first-
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derivative and the second-derivative algorithms employ the estimated first derivatives and the 
estimated second derivatives from the best-fit-third-degree polynomial, respectively. 
 
Based on the reference set of parameters ( )refrefref TK max,, β  from the construction phase, we define 
the search ranges of β, Tmax and K as presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4   There is no standard 
to define the search range based on a reference value.  The greater the search range, the more 
accurate the estimated parameters, but the longer the searching time.  In this thesis, we define the 
search range for β according to the observed behavior type, and Tmax based on short, medium, 
and long term deadlines. 
 
Table 4.2. Search Range for β in the Improvement Phase. 
βref Observed Behavior βlower βupper 
βref ≤ 0.5 Highly Boulware 0.01 1.00 
0.5 < βref < 1 Moderately Boulware 0.10 2 βref 
1 ≤ βref ≤ 3 Linear/Slightly Conceder 1.00 1.5 βref 
3 < βref ≤ 5 Moderately Conceder 0.5 βref 1.5 βref 
βref > 5 Highly Conceder 0.75 βref 1.25 βref 
Note: The incremental level of β is always 0.01 in this thesis. 
 
Table 4.3. Search Range for Tmax in the Improvement Phase. 
refTmax  Characteristic Tmax lower Tmax upper 
refTmax  ≤ 10 Short Term Deadline 5 2 
refTmax  
10 < refTmax  ≤ 30 Medium Term Deadline 0.5 
refTmax  1.5 
refTmax  
refTmax  > 30 Long Term Deadline 0.5 
refTmax  1.25 
refTmax  
Note: The incremental level of Tmax is always one in this thesis. 
 
Table 4.4. Search Range for K in the Improvement Phase. 
Kref Klower Kupper 
0 < Kref < 1 Kref – 0.2 Kref + 0.2 
Note: The incremental level of K is always 0.1 in this thesis. 
 When Klower < 0.1, Klower = 0.1 
 When Kupper > 0.9, Kupper = 0.9 
 
The pseudo-code of the improvement phase is presented in Figure 4.6.  With the search ranges, 
we next enumerate over K, β, and Tmax (Step 1), and find out Pmax and Pmin as given in Step 2.  
After that, we compute the SSE (see below for more explanation), and choose the parameters 
with the lowest SSE (Step 3). 
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For the price algorithm, we compute the estimated price, Pestimated(t), at t = 2 to N-1, by plugging 
into (3.1) the estimates of Pmax and Pmin (Step 3b of Figure 4.6a) and the values of K, β and Tmax 
(Step 2 of Figure 4.6a).  With these estimates, we compute the SSE between the actual price 
offers and the Pestimated(t) as given in Step 2 of Figure 4.6b.  The first- and the second-derivative 
algorithms are similar in idea, except that the values of K, β and Tmax and the estimates of Pmax 




 Set ( )refrefref TK max,, β  = estimated parameter set from the construction phase 
2) Defining 
 Set Klower, and Kupper based on 
refK  and Table 4.2 
 Set βlower, βupper based on 
refβ and Table 4.3 
 Set Tmax lower, Tmax upper, based on 
refTmax  and Table 4.4 
3) Estimating 
(a) For K = Klower to Kupper with an incremental level of 0.1 
     For Tmax = Tmax lower to Tmax upper with an incremental level of 1 
  For β = βlower to βupper, with an incremental level of 0.01 
(b)         Find Pmax and Pmin by equations (4.2) and (4.1) 
         If Pmax > 0, Pmin > 0, and Pmax > Pmin 
(c)   Compute SSE as in Figure 4.6b 
(d)   If SSE(K, Tmax, β) < minimum 
          Set minimum = SSE(K, Tmax, β) 




 ∧∧∧∧∧ KTPP ,,,, maxmaxmin β = (β, Tmax, K, Pmin, Pmax) 
   End If 
          End If 
  Next β 
    Next Tmax 
     Next K 
Figure 4.6a. Pseudo-code for the Improvement-Phase’s Algorithms. 
 
The Price Algorithm The First-Derivative Algorithm The Second-Derivative Algorithm 
1. Find the ( )tPestimated  from t = 2 to 
    (N – 1) by (3.1) 
 






 from t = 1 to          
    (N – 1) by (4.4) 
 








 from t = 1 to  
     (N – 1) by (4.5) 





















































tPTKSSE β  
Figure 4.6b. Pseudo-code for the SSE computation in the Improvement Phase.  
 
Figure 4.6. Pseudo-code of the Improvement Phase. 
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4.5 Using the Estimated Parameters 
The results from learning can be used to adjust the parameters of the time-dependent-tactical 
model.  This is important because the estimated parameters can be used as a guideline for 
deciding an agent’s concession level in the future.  However, depending on the accuracy of 
learning, the adjustment might cause an agent to achieve higher or lower negotiation 
performance.  This section introduces a reaction algorithm we use to change the values of the 
parameters of an agent’s time-dependent-tactical model.  This algorithm focuses on buying 
agents, but the essential logic is applicable, with suitable modification, to selling agents as well. 
 
Our algorithm consists of three phases: (1) Selection of Target Range, (2) Feasibility Check, and 
(3) Adjustment.  The purpose of the selection of target range is to find a range of estimated 
prices that might be beneficial to the agents, based on the estimated parameters.  In the 
feasibility-check phase, we find out the best-estimated price that is attainable according to the 
parameters of an agent’s current negotiation model.  Finally, in the adjustment phase, we change 
the values of the parameters of an agent’s negotiation model so that the agreement can be made 
at the desired estimated price.  We next explain these three phases.  The pseudo-code of our 
reaction algorithm is presented in Figure 4.11. 
 
4.5.1 Selection of Target Range 
The first step of our algorithm is to decide if we can achieve higher performance, based on the 
estimated parameters.  With the estimated price offers and our negotiation model, we can predict 
the final price of the agreement if one is possible.  Thus, by comparing this final price with the 
other estimated price offers, an agent can decide if a better deal is possible (Step 1c of Figure 
4.11).  Figure 4.7 shows a negotiation process involving a possible final agreement.  The 
estimated parameters indicate that an agreement will be made at point B.  If the agreement is 
made at other estimated prices between A and B, the buying agent can achieve higher 
performance. 
 
In another situation, wherein an agreement is not possible based on the estimated parameters, we 
include all estimated prices for consideration.  Figure 4.8 shows this situation.  According to the 
estimated prices, both parties will not compromise for an agreement (i.e., ti in Step 1d is not 
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present).  However, if the agreement is made at any estimated price between C and D, the buying 
agent can achieve higher performance.  Hence, tend is set to the turn corresponding to the highest-




































Figure 4.8. A Negotiation Process without any Possible Final Agreement. 
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4.5.2 Feasibility Check 
After obtaining a range of estimated prices which are beneficial to an agent, we find out the best-
estimated price that is attainable according to the parameters of an agent’s own negotiation 
model.  The best performance is achieved when the agreement is made at an opponent’s 
reservation price, which represents the maximum (minimum) price at which a buyer (seller) 
allows an agent to conclude an agreement.  Thus, we propose that each estimated price, starting 
from the reservation price, be justified for feasibility (Steps 2a and 2b).  That is, each offer has to 
satisfy three criteria given below. 
 
1) The estimated price must be less than or equal to the agent’s own reservation price.  
Since a buying agent cannot accept a price that is greater than its reservation price, any 
estimated price greater than its reservation price is not feasible (Criterion 1 of Step 2c). 
2) The estimated price must be greater than the current bid price.  Theorem 1 states that the 
price of a buying agent increases with the number of turns.  Thus, any estimated price 
less than or equal to the current bid price is not feasible.  This can be observed in Figure 
4.9 (See horizontal dotted line).  The estimated prices at E and F are less than the current 
bid price at t = 3, when the agent learns at t = 4 (Criterion 2 of Step 2c).   
3) The turn number corresponding to the candidate price needs to be smaller than or equal 
to the agent’s own Tmax.  In Figure 4.9, the estimated prices at G and H satisfy the first 
two criteria, but do not satisfy this criterion (Criterion 3 of Step 2c).  That is, the 














Buyer without learning Buyer with learning








Agent's Tmax = Target Turn
 




The adjustment phase is executed if and only if an attainable price is found.  In order to make the 
final price of the agreement to be the estimated one, an agent has to reach that desired price at the 
same turn as its opponent does.  We can do this by adjusting the values of the parameters of the 
agent’s time-dependent-tactical model.  The parameters to be changed are dependent on the 
agent’s own Tmax and the target turn at which the estimated price is attained.  Two cases result. 
 
Case I: Target Turn = Agent’s Tmax 
Figure 4.9 illustrates this case.  As shown therein, the lowest attainable estimated price is at point 
J.  With the target turn equal to the agent’s Tmax, point J is attainable by first adjusting the 
reservation price to equal J’s price (Step 3a).  Then, with the current β and K, the target turn and 
Tmax are offset by the number of turns since the last adjustment (Step 3b).  Finally, the price at 
the new t = 0 is reset to the current bid price, and the new Pmin is computed by (4.1) as given in 





Case II: Target Turn < Agent’s Tmax 
Figure 4.10 illustrates this case.  The lowest attainable estimated price is at point L.  Similar to 
Case I, we reset Tmax and the target turn and compute the new Pmin (Steps 3b and 3c). With the 
target turn smaller than the agent’s Tmax, we keep Pmax unchanged, and compute the new β by 

























































 is the estimated price that an agent tries to reach, tS, is the target turn, and tB is the 













Buyer without learning Buyer with learning
Actual Seller Predicted Seller
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Figure 4.10. Effect of Learning on Negotiation Outcome (Target Turn < Agent’s Tmax).
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1) Selection of Target Range 
(a) Set ),,,,( maxmaxmin
∧∧∧∧∧
KTPP β  = the set of the estimated parameters from learning 
(b)          Set tstart = max
∧
T  
(c)          Find out if there is a turn, ti, for a possible agreement between the estimated model of the seller (estimated  
  version of equation 3.2) and the agent’s own model (equation 3.1) 
(d)  If ti is present 
(e)                        Set tend = ti 
              Else 
(f)                        Set tend = the turn at which the highest estimated price is located 
              End If 
 
2) Feasibility Check 
(a) For tS  = tstart to tend Step –1 
(b)  Find ( )stP
∧
 by (3.2); replace the parameters with ),,,,( maxmaxmin
∧∧∧∧∧
KTPP β , and t with tS 
(c)  If       ( )stP
∧
 ≤ 
maxP  (Criteria 1) 
           and   P(t-1) < ( )stP
∧
  (Criteria 2), where t = current turn 
     and    tS ≤ maxT    (Criteria 3), Exit For Loop and Goto Step 3 
 Next tS  
(d) Skip Step 3 when all ( )stP
∧
 are not attainable  
 
3) Adjustment 
(a) If tS = maxT  
   Set =maxP ( )stP
∧
  
 End If 
(b) Set maxT = maxT – number of turns since last adjustment 
 Set  tB = tS – number of turns since last adjustment 
 (c) Find 
minP  by (4.1) and replace Pt=0 with P(t-1) 
 (d) If tB < maxT  
   Find β by (4.15) 
 End If 
Note: This is the pseudo-code for buying agents.  Modification is needed for selling agents. 
 
Figure 4.11. Pseudo-code of the Reaction Algorithm. 
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4.6 Number of Offers 
The learning algorithms discussed so far focus on learning using five price offers.  However, 
agents are not guaranteed to receive five price offers from their opponents in the whole 
negotiation process.  For example, when a selling agent starts a negotiation, the buying agent 
receives the first five price offers from the selling agent and estimates the parameters of the 
selling agent’s negotiation model.  Before the selling agent learns, the buying agent makes 
adjustment on the parameters of its negotiation model as given in §4.5.  Clearly then, the selling 
agent cannot use five offers from the buying agent, because the last offer is generated by the new 
(adjusted) parameters.  Hence, we propose that the selling agent estimates the parameters using 
four price offers from the buying agent.  We call this as 4-point learning. 
 
Although the buying agent obtains one more price offer for its first learning, this does not mean 
that the buying agent gains benefits in the whole negotiation process.  Since the buying agent 
adjusts its parameters first at the end of the first round of learning, during the second round of 
learning, the seller receives five buyer’s offers; by contrast the buyer has to do with four offers 
for the second round.  Thus, an agent alternates between 4-point and 5-point learning, until an 
agreement is reached or the negotiation is terminated. 
 
Both the learning and the reacting algorithms introduced in §4.4 and §4.5, respectively are 
applicable to 4-point and 5-point learning environments.  The only difference is the value of N, 
which represents the number of price offers from an opponent.  In 4-point learning environment, 
equation (3.1) at t = 4 is not available.  Thus, the sum of squared error between the estimated and 
the actual prices consists of four error terms in 4-point learning environment, while that consists 




5 Experimental Study of Heuristics 
 
In Chapter 4, we proposed heuristic algorithms for estimating the parameters of the time-
dependent-tactical model.  Our approach consists of three phases, and different algorithms were 
proposed in these phases.  In this chapter, we report on simulation experiments to assess the 
effectiveness of these algorithms.   
 
The performance measures used for testing are discussed in §5.1.  After that, propositions are 
stated in §5.2, and the corresponding experimental designs are presented in §5.3.  Experimental 
results and discussion appear in §5.4 and §5.5, respectively. 
 
5.1 Performance Measure 
Since the time-dependent-tactical model consists of five parameters, it is difficult to determine 
which estimation algorithm has better performance by comparing the estimated and the actual 
values of the individual parameters themselves.  In order to simplify this, we use a pooled 
performance measure, the sum of squared error (SSE) between the actual price and the estimated 
price.  This measure is also used in multiple regressions.  One advantage of this performance 
measure is that it is computed by combining the values of all five actual and estimated 
parameters.  We introduce three different types of SSEs.  They differ from one another in the 
range of the turns that is used in the computation. 
 
The first one restricts the SSE computation to the number of turns that has elapsed thus far in the 
negotiation process.  It is denoted as SSEF and is obtained by 
 



















learningpoint -5for     4





where ( )tP  is the actual price, and ( )tP
∧
 is the estimated price as given in Chapter 4. 
 
Another extreme is to compute the SSE over the entire negotiation time frame.  However, since 
different estimation algorithms have different estimated Tmax values that could in turn differ from 
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the actual Tmax, the number of error terms that must be included in the SSE computation becomes 
a concern.  For example, when the actual Tmax is greater than the estimated Tmax by two turns, the 
estimated prices at t = actual Tmax and t = actual Tmax – 1 are missing.  Thus, there is a difficulty 
in defining an equation to compute this SSE.  Hence, this performance measure is not used. 
 
The third measure, denoted as SSEN, is computed over the next subsequent turns.  As discussed 
in §4.6, agents continue learning process at periodic intervals.  Hence, the accuracy of an 
estimation algorithm at the next few turns is comparatively more important than that of the other 
two measures, because the parameters of the opponent’s negotiation model are estimated again at 
periodic intervals.  SSEN is computed over the next five turns, and is given by  
 













N   
 
where start is the number of turns elapsed thus far. 
 
In our experiment, both SSEF and SSEN were measured.  Since the SSEN is comparatively more 
important than the SSEF, only the SSEN is presented and used as the basis to validate the 
hypotheses presented hereon.  However, during the negotiation process, SSEN is not available, 
and only SSEF is available.  Thus, the relationship between SSEF and SSEN is addressed in §5.6.  
The purpose is to justify if SSEF could be a proxy measure for SSEN. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses in this section are proposed based on our observation, when designing the 
heuristic learning algorithms. 
 
5.2.1 Construction Phase 
In the construction phase, the objective is to find a set of tentative estimates for reference, based 
on the derivatives at t = 0.  Since accuracy is sacrificed while tractability is achieved, the 
accuracy of the estimated parameters in the construction phase is not expected to be good.  
According to §4.3, when the third-degree Taylor’s polynomial is used, the accuracy of the 
estimated derivatives is lower for higher-order derivatives (See Table 4.1).  By this, algorithms 
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with higher-order derivatives can be expected to have lower accuracy.  Thus, the two-derivative 
algorithm is predicted to have better performance than the three-derivative algorithm in the 
construction phase.  We therefore propose the following hypotheses. 
 
1) The SSEs of the construction-phase algorithms will be greater than zero. 
2) The two-derivative algorithm will perform better than the three-derivative algorithm in 
the construction phase. 
 
5.2.2 Improvement Phase 
We propose three hypotheses for the improvement phase.  First, the objective of the 
improvement phase is to obtain the best set of estimated parameters by defining a search range, 
based on the reference estimations obtained from the construction phase.  Since we start with 
these estimates and enumerate further, predictability is expected to be enhanced in the 
improvement phase. 
  
Our next hypothesis concerns the comparison among the three estimation algorithms in the 
improvement phase.  These three algorithms differ from one another in the equations applied in 
the enumeration.  Since the price offers in the price algorithm are actual values, while the 
derivatives in the other two algorithms are estimated from the best-fit curve, the price algorithm 
is predicted to outperform the other two algorithms. 
   
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 3, the value of β determines the concession behavior in the time-
dependent-tactical model.  When the value of β is close to zero or too high, highly boulware or 
highly conceder behavior are expected.  Based on our observation when designing the heuristic 
learning algorithms, fitting the price offers onto a best-fit curve for derivative estimation is more 
difficult when an opponent’s behavior is highly boulware or highly conceder.  Higher inaccuracy 
of the estimated derivatives is expected.  Therefore, all three improvement-phase algorithms are 
expected to perform better for β’s close to one than for other β’s.  Hence, the following 
hypotheses are suggested. 
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3) The predictability will be improved from the construction phase to the improvement 
phase. 
4) The price algorithm will outperform the other two estimation algorithms in the 
improvement phase. 
5) All three estimation algorithms in the improvement phase will perform better for β ≈ 1 
than for other β’s. 
 
5.3 Experimental Design 
Experiment #1) This experiment is designed for testing hypotheses 1 to 4.  There were two sets 
of replications in the experiment, one each for 5-point and 4-point learning.  For each 
experimental set of replications, one thousand sets of parameters of the time-dependent-tactical 
model were randomly generated.  The parameters that were held common to both sets were 
generated as given in Table 5.1.  In this experiment, the objective is to test the general 
performance of our learning algorithms.  In real-world cases, different users or agents usually 
have different values of the parameters in their negotiation models.  To obtain an average 
performance measure, we vary the parameters as specified in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Common Parameters for Experiment #1. 
Parameter Range 
β U[0.1, 10] 
Tmax U[20, 40] 
K U[0.1, 0.9] 
Pmin U[100, 250] 
Pmax U[300, 600] 
where U[a, b] represents a uniform distribution with a range of a and b. 
 
In both experimental sets, both construction-phase algorithms were run.  As discussed in §4.4.2, 
depending on the accuracy of the estimated derivatives from the best-fit curve, a tentative set of 
parameters is not guaranteed to be found in the construction phase.  Thus, when a solution was 
not available in both algorithms, learning was terminated and improvement phase was not 
started.  If solutions were available in both algorithms, the estimated parameter set with the least 
SSEF was selected as the final parameter set in the construction phase.  If a solution was only 
available in one of the two estimation algorithms, the estimated parameters were selected from 
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that algorithm.  Given the construction-phase estimates, the improvement phase always yields a 
solution.  Thus, all three improvement-phase algorithms were run. 
 
Experiment #2) In order to test the interaction effect between the value of β and the estimation 
algorithm in the improvement phase (Hypothesis 5), a 3 x 3 factorial experimental design was 
established, with three β groups and the three improvement-phase algorithms as the two factors.  
The experiment consisted of three treatments, and each experimental treatment was carried out 
with the assigned β group according to Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. The Range of β in Each β Group in the Experiment #2. 
β Group Lower Limit Upper Limit Experimental Treatment Number 
 
Low 0.01 0.5 1 
Medium 0.75 1.25 2 
High 5.0 7.5 3 
Tmax ∈  U[20, 22], K ∈  U[0.1, 0.2], Pmin ∈  U[100, 110], and Pmax ∈  U[250, 260] 
 
In each experimental treatment, the values of the other four parameters were varied within a 
small range, as given at the bottom of Table 5.2.  One thousand sets of parameters were 
randomly generated, and all three experimental treatments consisted of the same sets of 
parameters except for the β-values.  The experiment was conducted under 5-point learning only. 
 
5.4 Results 
ANOVA tests and t-tests were conducted to test the hypotheses.  The statistical test results for 
each of the five hypotheses are addressed in order. 
 
5.4.1 Performance of Construction Phase 
Hypothesis 1. (Estimates from Construction Phase are not Accurate)  Table 5.3 presents the 
mean SSEN from Experiment #1 for the construction-phase algorithms in both 5- and 4-point 
learning environments.  Among 1000 sets of parameters in 5-point learning environment, 973 
sets of estimated parameters were successfully found by the two-derivative algorithm, while 862 
sets were found by the three-derivative algorithm.  If the accuracy of the estimated parameters in 
the construction phase is good enough, the mean SSEN will have insignificant differences from 
zero.  Results from t-tests (Test value = 0, 95% confidence) indicate that the mean SSEN of the 
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two-derivative algorithm (M = 45.208) and the three-derivative algorithm (M = 747.959) are 
significantly different from zero (p < 0.0005). 
 
In 4-point learning environment, 988 sets of estimated parameters were successfully found by the 
two-derivative algorithm, while 894 sets were found by the three-derivative algorithm.  
According to Table 5.3, results from t-tests (Test value = 0, 95% confidence) indicate that the 
mean SSEN of the two-derivative algorithm (M = 39.311) and the three-derivative algorithm (M = 
599.195) are significantly different from zero (p < 0.0005).  In sum, hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 
Table 5.3. Accuracy of the Construction-Phase Algorithms. 
5-point Learning 4-point Learning Algorithm 
SSEN  t-test p-value SSEN  t-test p-value 
 
The Two-derivative Algorithm 
 
45.208 < 0.0005 39.311 < 0.0005 
The Three-derivative Algorithm 
 
747.959 < 0.0005 599.195 < 0.0005 
Note. t-tests were conducted with the test value = 0 at 95% confidence level 
 
Hypothesis 2. (Two-derivative Algorithm outperforms Three-derivative Algorithm)  This 
hypothesis is supported.  A t-test1 (95% confidence) between two construction-phase algorithms 
indicates that the mean SSEN of the two-derivative algorithm is significantly lower than that of 
the three-derivative algorithm in both 5-point (p < 0.0005) and 4-point (p < 0.0005) learning 
environments. 
 
5.4.2 Performance of Improvement Phase 
Hypothesis 3. (Accuracy is gained in the Improvement-Phase Algorithms)  Table 5.4 shows the 
mean SSEN of the construction phase and three improvement-phase algorithms for both 5-point 
and 4-point learning in Experiment #1. 
 
In 5-point learning environment, t-tests (95% confidence) between the construction phase and 
the improvement-phase algorithms indicate that the mean SSEN of the price algorithm (M = 
                                                        
1 Although there is a big difference between the two construction-phase algorithms, we formally conduct t-tests for 
the sake of uniformity and to make sure that all experimental results are statistically valid.  
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30.980), the first-derivative algorithm (M = 16.776) and the-second derivative algorithm (M = 
19.418) in the improvement phase are significantly lower than that in the construction phase (M 




Table 5.4. Accuracy Gained by the Improvement-Phase Algorithms. 
Learning 
Environment 





Final Selected Parameter Set 69.587 -- 
The Price Algorithm 30.980 < 0.0005 
The First-Derivative Algorithm 16.776 0.004 
5-point Learning 
Improvement 
The Second-Derivative Algorithm 19.418 0.007 
Construction 
 
Final Selected Parameter Set 42.054 -- 
The Price Algorithm 10.135 < 0.0005 
The First-Derivative Algorithm 17.293 < 0.0005 
4-point Learning 
Improvement 
The Second-Derivative Algorithm 34.466 0.265 
Note. Final Selected Parameter Set indicates the final parameter set selected in the construction phase according to 
the minimum SSEF between the two estimation algorithms. 
 
In 4-point learning environment, similar results are obtained in both the price and the first-
derivative algorithms.  We conduct t-tests (95% confidence) between the construction phase and 
the improvement-phase algorithms, and find that the mean SSEN of the price algorithm (M = 
10.135) and the first-derivative algorithm (M = 17.293) in the improvement phase are 
significantly lower than that in the construction phase (M = 42.054, p = 0.001, p < 0.0005 
respectively).  However, the mean SSEN of the second-derivative algorithm is not significantly 
different from that in the construction phase (p = 0.265).  
 
Hypothesis 4. (Price Algorithm outperforms the other Two Improvement-Phase Algorithms)  
This hypothesis is partially supported.  Table 5.5 shows the mean SSEN and one-way ANOVA 
test results of three improvement-phase algorithms for both 5-point and 4-point learning in 
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Experiment #1.  In addition, the post-hoc results of SSEN of three algorithms for both 5-point and 
4-point learning are illustrated in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.5. Comparisons among the Improvement-Phase Algorithms. 
Learning 
Environment 
Algorithm SSEN One-way ANOVA 
Test p-value 
 
The Price Algorithm 30.980 
The First-Derivative Algorithm 16.776 5-point Learning 




The Price Algorithm 10.135 
The First-Derivative Algorithm 17.293 4-point Learning 





Table 5.6. Post-hoc Results for comparing the Improvement-Phase Algorithms. 
Learning 
Environment 
Algorithms Comparison Post-hoc 
p-value 
 
The Price Algorithm vs. The First-Derivative Algorithm 0.389 
The Price Algorithm vs. The Second-Derivative Algorithm 0.535 5-point 
Learning The First-Derivative Algorithm vs. The Second-Derivative Algorithm 
 
0.968 
The Price Algorithm vs. The First-Derivative Algorithm 0.197 
The Price Algorithm vs. The Second-Derivative Algorithm < 0.0005 4-point 




In 5-point learning environment, when we conduct a one-way ANOVA test for the three 
improvement-phase algorithms, we do not observe any significant difference in the mean SSEN 
among the algorithms.  This is further illustrated by the post-hoc test results in Table 5.6.  In 4-
point learning environment, there is a significant difference.  Post-hoc results show that the mean 
SSEN of the price algorithm (M = 10.135) and the first-derivative algorithm (M = 17.293) are 
significantly lower than that of the second-derivative algorithm (M = 34.466, p < 0.0005, p < 
0.0005 respectively), but we do not observe any significant difference in SSEN between the price 
and the first-derivative algorithms. 
 
In sum, the price algorithm and the first-derivative algorithm outperform the second-derivative 
algorithm in 4-point learning environment.  On the other hand, in 5-point learning environment, 
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no conclusion can be made to identify which one of the three improvement-phase algorithms has 
the best performance.  This leads us to Experiment #2 for testing hypothesis 5. 
 
Hypothesis 5. (Interaction Effect between β and Improvement-Phase Algorithms)  A 3 x 3 two-
way ANOVA test was conducted to investigate the interaction effect between β and the 
improvement-phase algorithm.  Table 5.7 shows the mean SSEN for different β and 
improvement-phase algorithm combination.  Test result indicates that this hypothesis is partially 
supported. 
 
Table 5.7. The Mean SSEN for different β - Algorithm Combination. 
β Group Algorithm 
Low* Medium** High*** All β Groups 
 
The Price Algorithm 1.59 x 10-3 1.80 x 10-2 525.986 175.335 
The First-Derivative Algorithm 5.19 x 10-3 2.36 x 10-2 37.565 12.531 
The Second-Derivative Algorithm 1.23 x 10-3 4.03 x 10-3 2.221 0.742 
All Algorithms 2.67 x 10-3 1.52 x 10-2 188.591 62.870 
*Low β ∈  [0.01, 0.5] **Medium β ∈  [0.75, 1.25] ***High β ∈  [5.0, 7.5] 
 
The effect of improvement-phase algorithm on the SSEN in different β groups is depicted in 























Figure 5.1. Effect of Improvement-Phase Algorithm on SSEN in Different β Groups. 
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According to Figure 5.1 and Table 5.8, the mean SSEN of the second-derivative algorithm (M = 
1.23 x 10-3) and the price algorithm (M = 1.59 x 10-3) are significantly lower than that of the 
first-derivative algorithm (M = 5.19 x 10-3), when only the result in low β group is considered.  
Significant difference between the price algorithm and the second-derivative algorithm is not 
found.  In both medium and high β groups, we observe that the second-derivative algorithm 
outperforms the price algorithm and the first-derivative algorithm. 
 
Table 5.8. Post-hoc Results for the Effect of β Group on the Three Improvement-Phase 
Algorithms. 
β Group Algorithm Comparison Post-hoc 
p-value 
 
The Price Algorithm vs. The First-Derivative Algorithm < 0.0005 
The Price Algorithm vs. The Second-Derivative Algorithm 0.531 
Low 
The First-Derivative Algorithm vs. The Second-Derivative Algorithm 
 
< 0.0005 
 The Price Algorithm vs. The First-Derivative Algorithm 0.370 
The Price Algorithm vs. The Second-Derivative Algorithm 0.002 
Medium 
The First-Derivative Algorithm vs. The Second-Derivative Algorithm 
 
< 0.0005 
The Price Algorithm vs. The First-Derivative Algorithm < 0.0005 
The Price Algorithm vs. The Second-Derivative Algorithm < 0.0005 
High 




The effect of β group on the SSEN in different improvement-phase algorithms is depicted in 


























Table 5.9. Post-hoc Results for the Effect of Improvement-Phase Algorithm on β Groups. 
Algorithm β Group Comparison 
 
Post-hoc Test p-value 
Low vs. Medium 0.999 
Low vs. High < 0.0005 The Price Algorithm 
Medium vs. High 
 
< 0.0005 
Low vs. Medium 0.999 
Low vs. High < 0.0005 The First-Derivative 
Algorithm Medium vs. High 
 
< 0.0005 
Low vs. Medium 0.999 
Low vs. High < 0.0005 The Second-Derivative 




According to Figure 5.2 and Table 5.9, for all three improvement-phase algorithms, the mean 
SSEN of low and medium β groups are significantly lower than that of high β group.  However, 
we do not find any significant difference between low and medium β groups.  In summary, 




In sum, the estimation model given by the construction-phase algorithms is not accurate enough.  
This is expected because we focus on simplifying the equations rather than obtaining accurate 
estimates in the construction phase.  In addition, the two-derivative algorithm is found to 
outperform the three-derivative algorithm in the construction phase.  This is reasonable because 
the three-derivative algorithm consists of the estimated third derivative, which is not expected to 
be highly accurate.  Thus, the two-derivative algorithm achieves better predictability. 
 
The price algorithm, the first-derivative algorithm and the second-derivative algorithm are found 
to have improvement in predictability from the construction phase to the improvement phase in 
5-point learning environment.  However, only the price and the first-derivative algorithms have 
improvement in 4-point learning environment.  According to Table 5.3, the second-derivative 
algorithm also demonstrates improvement in predictability from the construction phase to the 
improvement phase in 4-point learning environment, but the improvement is not significant 
enough.  Generally, higher predictability is achieved in the improvement phase than in the 
construction phase.  The result is expected because the improvement phase focuses on accuracy 
of the estimated parameters. 
 
In the improvement phase, both the price algorithm and the first-derivative algorithm outperform 
the second derivative algorithm in 4-point learning environment.  In 5-point learning 
environment, no conclusion can be made to identify which one of the three estimation algorithms 
has the best performance, based on the results in Experiment #1.  However, according to the 
results in Experiment #2, the second-derivative algorithm is found to outperform the other two 
improvement-phase algorithms in both medium and high β groups in 5-point learning 
environment.  In addition, the second-derivative and the pirce algorithms achieve higher 
performance than the first-derivative algorithm in low β group.  Overall, the second-derivative 
algorithm is recommended to be implemented in 5-point learning environment, while either the 
price algorithm or the first-derivative algorithm is recommended in 4-point learning 












The Two-Derivative Algorithm 
4-point Learning The Price Algorithm or The First-Derivative Algorithm Improvement 
5-point Learning The Second-Derivative Algorithm 
 
Finally, all three estimation algorithms in the improvement phase are found to have lower 
predictability in cases where β is high than in cases where β is low or close to one.  That is, 
based on our tests, our learning algorithms are more effective on agents with boulware or linear 
behaviors than with conceder behavior. 
 
5.6 Proxy Measure for SSEN 
Our results so far are based on the performance measure of SSEN, because, as discussed in §5.2, 
the SSEN is comparatively more important than SSEF.  However, the computation of SSEN 
involves un-received price offers.  Hence, during the negotiation process, we can get SSEF but 
not SSEN.  The question then is whether SSEF could be a proxy measure for SSEN. 
 
To test this, we determine the correlation coefficient between the SSEF and the SSEN.  Prediction 
of the SSEN based on the SSEF was tried unsuccessfully.  Table 5.11 gives the correlation 
coefficient between the SSEF and the SSEN for our various algorithms in Experiment #1. 
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Phase Algorithm Correlation 
Coefficient 
p-value 
The Two-derivative Algorithm 0.451 < 0.0005 
Construction The Three-derivative Algorithm 0.508 < 0.0005 
 
The Price Algorithm 0.976 < 0.0005 




The Second-Derivative Algorithm 0.127 < 0.0005 
     
The Two-derivative Algorithm 0.342 < 0.0005 
Construction The Three-derivative Algorithm 0.540 < 0.0005 
 
The Price Algorithm 0.774 < 0.0005 




The Second-Derivative Algorithm 0.242 < 0.0005 
 
Note. The algorithms in the shaded cells are the selected algorithms in the construction and the improvement phases 
of the proposed learning approach. 
 
The results therein indicate that all correlation coefficients are significant.  The SSEF and the 
SSEN are highly correlated for the price algorithm, but this does not appear to be so in other 
algorithms.  Even though the correlation coefficients are low in some cases, we still use SSEF as 
a proxy, because of two reasons.  First, SSEN is not available during a negotiation process.  In 
addition, according to our experimental results in Chapters 8 and 9, when we use SSEF as a 
proxy, our learning algorithms are effective in arriving at a solution, and more importantly, in 




6 Electronic Negotiation Agent Design 
 
In Chapter 4, we have developed heuristic learning algorithms for estimating the parameters of 
the time-dependent-tactical model.  In Chapter 5, we have conducted simulation to assess the 
effectiveness of the estimation algorithms in each phase.  In this chapter, we introduce how to 
integrate our proposed learning algorithms into negotiation agents. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, many electronic negotiation agents have been designed to test the 
feasibility of different negotiation models (Faratin et al., 1997; Zeng & Sycara, 1998; Sim & 
Chan, 2000; Zacharia et al., 2001; Deveaux et al., 2001).  A basic design of a negotiation agent 
consists of two steps: user interaction and negotiation process. 
 
In the user interaction step, users specify their preferences to the agents.  Common parameters 
include the minimum and maximum values of the negotiating issues.  Further, depending on the 
agent design, other parameters include the time limit of the negotiation, the weight of each 
negotiating issue in the utility calculation, and the choice of negotiation tactics.  In any case, 
once users’ preferences are specified, agents start negotiations without further user interactions 
until negotiations end.  The second part of an agent design is the negotiating process, in which 
buying and selling agents exchange offers.  Agents evaluate the opponents’ offers and make 
decisions to accept or reject the offers.  If agents prefer to continue the negotiation process, they 
employ their negotiation tactics to determine the values of the negotiating issues, and make 
counter-offers.  Agents continue the negotiation process until the negotiation ends, which occurs 
when either agent terminates the process because of time expiry, or when both parties 
compromise the values of the negotiating issues. 
 
Sim & Chan (2000) have further modified the above design by adding a matching process that 
connects certain buying agents with certain other selling agents.  At the beginning of the 
matching process, an agent looks for candidate opponents with whom to negotiate in the market 
(Selecting).  After opponents are selected, the utility of each tentative connection is evaluated, 
and compared with a defined criterion (Evaluating Connection).  If the utility exceeds certain 
threshold level, which will be referred to as the filtering threshold in this thesis, the connection 
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between the agents is selected as one feasible negotiation.  If the utility does not exceed this 
filtering threshold, the negotiation will not start (Filtering Connection).  Agents continue this 
matching process until all possible connections are processed, or the number of feasible 
negotiations reaches certain limit.  The flowchart of the electronic negotiation agent design 
containing the users’ interaction with agents, the matching process, and the negotiation process is 
depicted in Figure 6.1. 
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With Figure 6.1 as a framework, Sundarraj (2002) has introduced several new components into 
the design of a negotiation agent.  These components include analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP), situational power, and goal constraints.  In §6.1, we introduce how to integrate the 
analytical hierarchy process for computing the utility.  In order to test the effects of situational 
power and goal constraints on electronic negotiation outcome, we present how to incorporate the 
situational power component as well as the goal setting component into our electronic 
negotiation agent.  Finally, in §6.2, we show how the learning algorithms introduced in Chapter 
4 can be integrated into our agent. 
 
6.1 Integration of AHP, Situational Power and Goal Setting 
The parameters to be specified into our electronic negotiation agent are identified in Figure 6.2. 
They are similar to those in Figure 6.1 except for some new parameters which are shaded.  The 
negotiation tactic is the time-dependent-tactical model introduced in Chapter 3.  The parameters 
of the time-dependent-tactical model represent the negotiating range of the negotiating issues, 
the time limit of the negotiation, and the type of negotiation behavior.  Instead of specifying the 
weights of the negotiating issues for computing the utility, we use AHP to represent the 
importance level between any two negotiating issues according to the users’ preference level.  
Situational power, which represents market conditions, is manipulated by AHP as well.  Finally, 
we manipulate goal constraints by a utility level that users want their agents to accomplish in 
negotiations. 
 
-- Goal Setting (Final Threshold)• Time Limit of Negotiation
-- Situational Power Setting (AHP)• Range of Negotiating Issue
-- Preference (AHP)• Negotiation Tactic
Specificaton of Parameters (§6.1)
New Parameters
 
Figure 6.2. The Parameters to be Specified to the Negotiation Agent. 
 
6.1.1 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
We reviewed different utility-based functions in Chapter 2, but AHP has not been implemented 
in any electronic negotiation agent so far.  A negotiation often involves multiple attributes.  In 
order to find an overall measure of the values of the negotiating attributes, utility can be 
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evaluated by AHP, if users’ preference levels of these attributes are specified into their 
negotiation agents (Sundarraj, 2002).  In AHP, users’ preference levels are specified in 
preference pairwise matrix to reflect their interests in different factors and properties.  Besides 
the negotiating attributes, Sundarraj (2002) has also applied AHP to non-negotiating attributes.  
Non-negotiating attributes refer to those issues or factors that cannot be negotiated, but act as 
major components of the utility.  For example, when a buyer wants to buy a house, and several 
houses are available from several different sellers, the locations of these houses are not 
negotiable, but they are major decision factors when the buyer makes choices. 
 
There is a difference in the content of the preference pairwise matrix between a buying agent and 
a selling agent.  The preference pairwise matrix of a buying agent involves both negotiating and 
non-negotiating attributes, while that of a selling agent consists of negotiating issues only.  The 
reason is that non-negotiating issues are usually the properties of the selling products.  Since the 
values of these issues are fixed, and are not considered as decision factors for selling agents in 
negotiations, they are not taken into account in the utility calculation for selling agents.  Thus, 
for selling agents, the preference levels of the non-negotiating issues are not required in our 
design. 
 
6.1.2 Modeling Situational Power 
The situational power of an agent is defined as its perception about the preferences of the market 
at large for the product of interest.  In our agent design, situational power represents the 
perceived power of an agent.  Consistent with the method to elicit a buyer’s preference in §6.1.1, 
situational power is also manipulated by AHP.  This manner of manipulating situational power 
using AHP is similar to the application of AHP in benchmarking an organization’s performance 
(Forman & Gass, 2001).  By using AHP, an organization can compare itself with the best-of-
breed organization, and thereby evaluating its process.  In other words, a comparison of the AHP 
scores between two companies can indicate how much a company performs better than the other 
one does.  We apply this idea to the context of situational power by comparing an agent’s 
perception of the market preferences for the product of interest with a neutral set of preferences.  
That is, we compare the AHP utilities between buyers in the market with a neutral buyer, and use 
the difference to represent the level of power. 
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To perform the above comparison, we use preference pairwise matrix to specify the preferences 
of the market.  Given an agent’s perception of the market preferences, a market utility, MU, can 
be computed using AHP for each seller’s product.  To model situational power, we establish a 
neutral buyer who prefers all negotiating and non-negotiating issues equally.  In other words, 
each cell in the preference pairwise matrix is equal to one.  According to the preference of this 
neutral buyer, a neutral utility, NU, can also be computed by AHP.  The difference between MU 
and NU is used as a measure of situational power.  For example, when MU > NU, buyers in the 
market have comparatively a higher preference for the seller’s product.  In other words, there is a 
high competition from other buying agents, and the situational power of the buying agent is 
reduced.  On the other hand, the power of the selling agent increases, because the market likes its 
product. 
 
Pruitt (1981) and Rubin & Brown (1975) suggested that negotiators who see themselves as 
powerful usually extract a large concession from their opponents, and make small concession of 
their own.  Mathematically, we react to this situational power by adjusting the value of β in the 
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where User-Specified β Change represents the maximum allowable change of β specified by 
users.  As MU is greater than NU, buyers in the market have a higher preference on the seller’s 
product.  Thus, buying agents see themselves as less powerful.  In order to have higher 
competitive advantage, buying agents increase their concession rates.  On the other hand, selling 
agents are said to have comparatively higher power, and they decrease their concession rates.  
When MU is smaller than NU, buying agents decrease their concession rates, while selling agents 
do the opposite. 
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6.1.3 Modeling Goal Setting 
A goal for an agent can be represented by a utility value that a user wants the agent to achieve 
before concluding a negotiation.  This utility will be named as final threshold in this thesis.  
When a final threshold is specified, an agreement can only be made when the individual utility 
of the agreement is greater than or equal to the final threshold. 
 
Since users are not expected to perform utility calculation before specifying their final threshold 
values to agents, it is possible that the values of the negotiating issues in some of the offers do 
not satisfy the final thresholds.  To prevent this anomaly, we adjust the reservation values of the 
negotiating issues.  For example, when a buying agent negotiates the price of a product, the 
individual utility decreases from Pmin to Pmax.  When a final threshold is specified, the utility at 
Pmax might be lower than the final threshold.  If this is the case, we use AHP to compute the price 
offer corresponding to the final threshold, and use that price as the new reservation price. 
 
6.2 Integration of Learning 
The algorithms to estimate the parameters of an opponent’s time-dependent-tactical model, and 
the algorithm to react to the estimates have been presented in §4.4 and §4.5, respectively.  In this 
section, we introduce how to integrate these algorithms into the agent outlined in §6.1. 
 
When an agent reaches the turn to learn as in 4-point and 5-point learning discussed in §4.6, it 
carries out the learning process as described below.  The learning component in our negotiation 
agent consists of three phases: (1) Checking, (2) Estimating and (3) Reacting.  The flowchart of 
these three phases is depicted in Figure 6.3.  The objective of the checking phase is to validate if 
an opponent’s offers since the last learning still satisfy the current estimation model that has been 
constructed at the last learning turn.  If an opponent’s moves since last learning cannot be 
predicted by the current estimation model, an agent obtains a new set of estimated parameters in 
the estimating phase, and adjusts the parameters of its negotiation model in the reacting phase.  
On the other hand, if the current estimation model is still valid, the estimating and the reacting 
phases are skipped.  The validity of the current estimation model is justified, based on the value 
of the regression parameter, R2.  If R2 ≥ 0.95, we assume that the agent continues using the 
current estimation model for prediction.   
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Figure 6.3. The Flowchart of Learning Component of Negotiation Agent Design. 
 
In the estimating phase, an agent implements the algorithms in §4.4 to determine the parameters 
of its opponent’s time-dependent-tactical model.  According to the results and discussion in 
Chapter 5, our negotiation agent carries out the two-derivative algorithm in the construction 
phase.  In the improvement phase, we implement the second-derivative algorithm and the price 
algorithm in 5-point and 4-point learning environments, respectively. 
 
In the reacting phase, an agent implements the reaction algorithm in §4.5 to adjust the parameters 
of its time-dependent-tactical model. 
 
6.3 Summary 
When the power setting, goal setting and learning are integrated into the agent depicted in Figure 
6.1, a revised flowchart of the negotiation agent design can be presented as in Figure 6.4.  First, a 
user specifies his/her preferences to an agent.  In the matching step, the agent looks for 
opponents for tentative negotiations in the market.  When candidate opponents are found, the 
agent adjusts the parameters of its negotiation tactic according to the perceived power and goal 
setting.  Then the agent computes the utilities for all potential connections, and decides which 
connections are feasible based on the filtering threshold.  After that, the agent proceeds to the 
negotiating step, and exchanges offer with its opponents.  There are three stopping criteria to the 
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negotiation process.  First, if the agent reaches its time limit, the negotiation is terminated, and 
becomes failed.  Second, if the agent has a goal constraint, and reaches its last negotiation turn, it 
completes the transaction when the received offer satisfies the goal.  When these two criteria are 
not satisfied, the agent computes its next offer, and compares with the current received offer.  
For a buying (selling) agent, if the utility function of the negotiating issue is decreasing 
(increasing), and its next offer is greater (less) than the current received one, an agreement is 
made based on the received offer.  Otherwise, the agent keeps on negotiating by making a 
counter offer.  This negotiating process continues until either party terminates the process, or 
both agents compromise for an agreement.  When the agent learns, it implements the learning 
algorithms at periodic intervals.  The agent carries out learning before it computes its next offer.  
This ensures that the next offer is built based on the new negotiation model.  The agent stops 
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Figure 6.4. The Revised Flowchart of the Electronic Negotiation Agent Design. 
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7 Hypotheses from Human Negotiation Research 
 
Thus far in this thesis, we have presented how situational power, goal setting, and learning can 
be incorporated into our electronic negotiation framework.  In this chapter, we present the 
hypotheses on the effects of situational power, goal setting and learning on human negotiation 
outcome.  Also, we present the experimental design for testing the hypotheses in the electronic-
negotiation context.  Results with these experiments will be given in the next two chapters. 
 
The effects of perceived power and goal setting on negotiation outcome have been frequently 
studied in the past few decades.  Several hypotheses have been tested and verified in human 
negotiation.  However, the effects of power, goal setting, and learning on electronic negotiation 
have not been established.  Since one desirable goal in this thesis is to make electronic 
negotiations to be more human-like, the agreement becomes an important element to assess the 
effectiveness of our integration methodologies.  In order to fill in this gap, hypotheses tested in 
human negotiation are taken up for validation in the electronic setting.  Our objective here is not 
to propose new theories, but to test the level of agreement between human and electronic 
negotiations.  Although the effect of learning has been tested by incorporating Bayesian learning 
and genetic algorithms into electronic negotiation agents, the joint effect of learning and power 
as well as that of learning and goal setting have not been examined before.  Several hypotheses 
on joint effects are proposed and tested in this thesis. 
 
First, performance measures used for validation are identified in §7.1.  Then the effects of 
perceived power and goal setting in human negotiation are reviewed.  Also, hypotheses on the 
effects of perceived power, goal setting as well as the joint effects by incorporating learning in 
electronic negotiation are proposed.  The experimental design is given in §7.5. 
 
7.1 Performance Measure 
We introduce six performance measures to validate the hypotheses proposed in this chapter.  A 
summary of the measures is presented in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1. Summary of Performance Measures. 
Name of Performance Measure Notation of Performance Measure 
Impasse Rate IR 
Individual Utility IU 
Joint Utility JU 
Number of Turns NT 
Distance to Nash Solution DN 
 
Impasse Rate (IR) 
The impasse rate of an agent represents the failure rate of negotiations that have been started by 
the agent.  Impasse rate is the number of incomplete transactions divided by the number of 
transactions in which the agent has participated. 
 
Individual Utility (IU) 
The individual buying (selling) agent utility represents the utility that a buying (selling) agent 
achieves in a dyad, when an agreement is made.  It is computed by the AHP technique outlined 
in Chapter 6, and is based on the final values of the negotiating issues in a negotiation as well as 
on the preference pairwise matrices of the agent.  According to Tripp & Sondak (1992), we take 
into account the impasse rate in utility computation, or else, experimental results might be 
biased.  When a dyad fails to reach an agreement, an impasse is declared, and both the buying 
and selling agents receive zero utilities for that negotiation (Hamner and Harnett, 1974; Pinkley 
et al., 1994). 
 
Joint Utility (JU) 
The joint utility of a dyad (i, j), which consists of a buying agent i and a selling agent j, is the 
sum of the individual utility of the buying agent and the individual utility of the selling agent. 
 
JUij = BUij + SUij         (7.1) 
 
where BU is the buying agent’s IU, and SU is the selling agent’s IU. 
 
Number of Turns (NT) 
This measure indicates the number of turns needed by a dyad to successfully complete an 
agreement, or the number of turns that has elapsed before the negotiation is terminated. 
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Distance to Nash Solution (DN) 
The distance to Nash solution measures the fairness of a completed negotiation (Goh et al., 2000; 
Lim et al., 1993).  The Nash solution is the settlement in which the product of the utilities of the 
buyer and the seller is maximized.  According to Goh et al. (2000) and Lim et al. (1993), the 
distance to Nash solution of a dyad (i, j) is computed as 
 
 ( ) ( )22 ijijijij SNSUBNBUDN −+−=       (7.2) 
 
where BN and SN represent the buying agent’s and the selling agent’s utilities corresponding to 
the Nash solution. 
 
In this thesis, we will use the above performance measures in the manner that they were used in 
the human negotiations described below.  Thus, only a subset of the performance measures is 
used in each experiment. 
 
7.2 Effect of Perceived Power 
As discussed in Chapter 6, situational power is a function of market-level behavior.  
Understanding market condition is one important factor to obtain competitive advantage.  
Zacharia et al. (2001) investigated the microeconomic effects of a dynamic pricing algorithm in 
a reputation-brokered agent.  They observed that this dynamic pricing algorithm was found to be 
effective based on market conditions.  Part et al. (1999) also stated that modeling the overall 
market behavior of an auction process is more effective than modeling the interior reasoning of 
each agent participating in an auction, because modeling the negotiation behavior of each agent 
is too enormous and takes time.  Thus, the incorporation of market conditions into electronic 
negotiation agents becomes important, although the above-mentioned researchers did not 
incorporate power. 
 
In the field of psychology, power is defined as the level of dependency between two parties.  
Power of A over B can be represented by the dependency of B on A for certain things (Emerson, 
1962).  In the past few decades, the effect of power on human negotiation has been frequently 
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studied and tested.  Pinkley et al. (1994) designed an experiment which consisted of buyers and 
sellers with high level of BATNA (Best Alternative to The Negotiated Agreement), low level of 
BATNA and no BATNA.  A 3 x 3 experiment was conducted by allowing all possible 
combinations of subjects to negotiate with each other in a fixed time period.  McAlister et al. 
(1986) investigated the effect of power by setting up an experiment with four market conditions.  
The market condition is dependent on the ratio of the number of seller to the number of buyer, 
and on the maximum number of transactions that buyers and sellers were allowed to complete.  
Dwyer & Walker (1981) conducted an experiment, which consisted of balanced power in one 
condition and imbalanced power in another one, again by varying the number of negotiators in 
the market.  The experiment consisted of one manufacturer and one retailer in the balanced 
power condition, and one manufacturer and two retailers in the imbalanced power condition.  
Thus, the manufacturer gains situational power in the latter condition.  Greenhalgh et al. (1985) 
investigated the joint effects of preferences, personality, and situational power on negotiation 
outcomes.  In their experiment, situational power was manipulated by varying the number of 
alternative parties with which the subjects would meet their needs.  Among these papers, several 
similar hypotheses were validated, although there are some differences as discussed below. 
 
Individual Performance 
The hypothesis that has been frequently tested is that negotiators with higher power outperform 
those with lower power.  This hypothesis is strongly supported in all the studies.  Pinkley et al. 
(1994) found that negotiators with high BATNAs would outperform those with low and no 
BATNAs, because they could earn higher utility in the negotiated agreements.  McAlister et al. 
(1986) found that higher-power negotiators achieved agreements with higher profitability per 
transaction as well as greater overall profitability in the entire market than lower-power 
negotiators.  Similarly, Dwyer & Walker (1981) found that the manufacturer gained more profits 
when the manufacturer gained power in imbalanced power situation.  The reason for this finding 
is that negotiators with higher power tend to behave exploitatively, while those with lower power 






Another hypothesis that receives high attention is that agreements will be more integrative in 
equal-power situations than in unequal-power situations.  Both Dwyer & Walker (1981), and 
McAlister et al. (1986) obtained results to support that joint utility in an equal-power condition is 
higher than that in an unequal-power condition.  Since the high-power negotiators tend to push 
for agreements that favor them on both high-priority and low-priority issues, the low-power 
negotiators lose advantage of trade-offs between differently prioritized issues.  Thus, agreements 
become less integrative.  On the other hand, Pinkley et al. (1994) proposed that joint utility in an 
imbalanced power situation is higher than that in a balanced power situation.  In an imbalanced 
power situation, lower-power negotiators tend to increase their profits by finding a settlement 
that increases the size of the share of the resource pool of the higher-power negotiators, while 
simultaneously the lower-power negotiators keep part of the expanded pool.  However, the 
experimental results from Pinkley et al. (1994) did not indicate any significant difference in joint 
utilities between balanced power and imbalanced power situations.  Among 28 studies that 
addressed these two propositions, four supported Pinkley’s proposition (See Rubin & Brown, 
1975 for a summary), while the remaining 24 studies supported the proposition from Dwyer & 
Walker (1981) and McAlister et al. (1986). 
 
Number of Turns 
Dwyer & Walker (1981) investigated the effect of power on the number of offers exchanged, 
before successfully concluding a negotiation.  The results showed that fewer number of offers 
were required in the imbalanced power situation than in the balanced power situation.  In their 
experiment, the balanced power condition consisted of one manufacturer and one retailer, while 
the imbalanced power condition consisted of one manufacturer and two retailers.  Thus, the 
retailers in the imbalanced power condition were considered to have lower power.  Since the 
low-power retailers had to compete with each other to make successful deals with the sole high-
power manufacturer, the low-power retailers were more anxious than the high-power 
manufacturer to complete the transaction.  The number of bid offers to complete the negotiation 





The effect of power on the Nash solution (Nash, 1950; Nash, 1953) has not been verified in any 
papers addressed above.  Neslin & Greenhalgh (1983) and Eliashberg et al. (1986) found that 
Nash solution can be used to predict the outcome of a negotiation.  This brings out the 
importance of the Nash solution, and hence, in this thesis, we employ the distance to Nash 
solution to measure the fairness of the negotiation agreements.  Negotiation agreements with 
balanced power are expected to be fairer than those with imbalanced power.  This hypothesis 
will be validated in electronic negotiation. 
 
A summary of the hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Individual Level 
P1)      Agents with higher perceived power will have higher individual utilities than those  
with lower perceived power. 
Dyadic Level 
P2)      Joint utility in a balanced power condition will be higher than that in an imbalanced  
            power condition. 
P3)       The levels of perceived power of both agents will have a positive and additive effect  
on the time to reach agreements. 
P4)      Distance to Nash solution in a balanced power condition will be lower than that in an  
          imbalanced power condition. 
 
7.3 Joint Effect of Perceived Power and Learning 
The joint effect of power and learning has not been studied so far in both human and electronic 
negotiations.  Zeng & Sycara (1998) found that learning is beneficial in a negotiation model.  
Deveaux et al. (2001) also found that an agent’s success in a negotiation can be enhanced by 
adapting the agent’s tactics to the behavior of the other party, based on its belief of its opponent.  
Thus, when agents learn, they are predicted to have better performance.  Higher individual utility 
and higher joint utility are expected.  In addition, power and learning are expected to have an 
interaction effect.  Agents with higher power tend to make the agreements more favorable to 
them.  If they learn, they might further pull the agreements to favor them with a greater extent.  
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On the other hand, low-power agents with learning tend to gain higher individual utilities than 
those without learning, although they simultaneously behave submissively based on the market 
condition.  Learning is believed to be more effective on high-power agents than on low-power 
agents. 
 
Since high-power agents are expected to achieve higher individual utilities than low-power 
agents, and learning is expected to be beneficial to the agents, we propose that when agents 
learn, agents with higher power still outperform those with lower power. 
 
In addition, Zeng & Sycara (1998) investigated the effect of Bayesian learning on Nash solution.  
A Nash solution is the highest when both parties learn while is the lowest when only one party 
learns.  A negotiation agreement becomes fairer as both parties learn. 
 
Based on the discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed and will be tested on both the 
individual and dyadic levels. 
 
Individual Level 
PL1)    Agents with learning will have higher individual utilities than those without learning. 
PL2)    Learning will provide a higher increase in individual utility for agents with higher  
power as compared to agents with lower power. 
PL3)    When learning is implemented, agents with higher power will have higher individual  
            utilities than those with lower power. 
Dyadic Level 
PL4)    In both balanced and imbalanced power conditions, agreements with learning will  
            have higher joint utilities, and lower distances to Nash solution than those without  
 learning. 
 
7.4 Effect of Goal Setting 
Besides power, high attention has also been focused on the effect of goal setting on human 
negotiation.  Locke et al. (1981) stated that a goal is what an individual tries to accomplish.  
Based on a review of a number of laboratory and experimental studies on the effects of goal 
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setting on the performance of a task, Locke et al. (1981) concluded that in 90% of the studies, 
higher performance is obtained with specific and challenging goals rather than with easy goals, 
“do your best” goals, or no goals.  In order to test the effect of goal setting in human negotiation, 
further studies and experiments on integrative negotiation were conducted. 
 
Individual Utility 
According to Locke, negotiators with specific and difficult goals are expected to achieve higher 
individual utilities than those with easy or no goals.  Hamner & Harnett (1974) defined two 
levels of goal setting as high and low for negotiators to negotiate within a fixed time period.  
They found that the higher a negotiator’s goal, the better would be his/her performance on the 
bargaining task.  Other studies showed the goal manipulation by setting minimum profit levels 
that negotiators had to obtain based on the payoff tables (Bazerman & Neale, 1985; Huber & 
Neale, 1986; Huber & Neale, 1987).  Participants were asked not to make agreements when the 
minimum profit level cannot be reached.  Bazerman & Neale (1985) found that negotiators with 
moderately difficult set profit constraints would achieve more profitable individual agreements 
and greater overall profitability than negotiators without set constraints.  Both Huber & Neale 
(1986) and Huber & Neale (1987) found a positive and linear relationship between goal 
difficulty and a negotiator’s performance.  In addition, Huber & Neale (1986) indicated that 
individual negotiator’s performance would be higher for specific goal than for non-specific goal.  
These findings will be verified in electronic negotiation in this thesis. 
 
Pruitt (1981) stated that negotiators with a higher level of goal difficulty might be more likely to 
despair of reaching agreements, because they are further apart from each other at any given time.  
However, this has not been validated in any of the papers cited above.  The effect of goal setting 
on the impasse rate of a negotiation will be tested.  Hypotheses on the relationship between goal 
difficulty and impasse rate as well as that between goal difficulty and individual negotiator’s 
performance are presented as follows. 
 
Individual Level 
G1)      Impasse rate has a positive and linear dependence on goal difficulty. 
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G2)      Agents with specific goals will have higher individual utilities than those with non- 
            specific goals. 
G3)      Individual utility has a positive and linear dependence on goal difficulty. 
 
In the literature we surveyed, only Huber & Neale (1986) studied the effect of goal difficulty on 
dyadic performance.  They proposed that the goal difficulty of the negotiators would have a 
positive and additive effect on dyadic performance.    When negotiators goals were not 
sufficiently high, they made concession quickly.  When their goals were difficult, they focused 
on their individual gains rather than on joint profits.  Thus, when negotiator goals were 
homogeneous, highest joint profits would be obtained when both negotiators had moderate goals 
instead of difficult goals.  When both negotiators had difficult goals, the goals were too difficult 
and too specific to energize performance.  However, when both negotiators had moderate goals, 
high joint profit was achieved because there was still room for integrative agreements (Huber & 
Neale, 1986).  On the other hand, when negotiator goals were disparate, highest joint profits 
were obtained when one negotiator had a moderate goal while the other had a difficult goal.  
Under this condition, there was still room for conflict resolution so that highly integrative 
behavior was observed (Huber & Neale, 1986).  All of these findings in human negotiation will 
be tested in electronic setting in the dyadic level. 
 
Dyadic Level 
G4)      The assigned goals of both agents will have a positive and additive effect on joint  
            utility. 
G5)      When agent goals are homogeneous, joint utility will be the highest when both agents  
            have moderate goals. 
G6)      When agent goals are disparate, joint utility will be the highest when one agent  
            has a difficult goal and the other has a moderate goal. 
 
Pruitt (1981) stated that negotiators with a high level of goal difficulty require a longer time to 
reach agreements.  In order to verify this, the following hypothesis on the relationship between 




G7)      The assigned goals of both agents will have a positive and additive effect on the time  
            to reach agreements. 
 
Huber & Neale (1986) also investigated the relative effects of goals, by examining the relative 
profitability of negotiators assigned disparate goals.  Since goal difficulty was believed to have a 
positive and linear relationship with the individual performance of a negotiator, they stated that 
in disparate goal conditions, negotiators with more difficult goals were more profitable than 
negotiators with less difficult goals.  This hypothesis will be also validated in the electronic 
negotiation. 
 
Relative Effects of Goals 
G8)      When goals are disparate between two negotiation agents, the agent with the more  
difficult goal will achieve higher individual utility than the one with the less difficult  
goal. 
 
7.5 Joint Effect of Goal Setting and Learning 
The joint effect of goal setting and learning has not been studied so far in both human and 
electronic negotiations.  Deveaux et al. (2001) found that agents achieved higher performance 
when they adapted their negotiation strategy to the behavior of their opponents.  Thus, higher 
individual and joint utilities are expected when agents learn.   
 
When the level of goal difficulty increases, the potential for conflict resolution and the room for 
integrative behavior decrease.  Information obtained from learning becomes less helpful.  Since 
agents with more difficult goals already completed fewer number of agreements (i.e., higher 
impasse rate), there is not as much room for such agents to further adjust their negotiation tactics, 
unlike agents with less difficult goals.  Thus, learning is believed to have higher effect on agents 
with non-specific and easy goals than on agents with moderate and difficult goals.  This is 
contrary to the observation related to situational power, in which more powerful agents 
experience greater increases in individual utilities from learning. 
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Although information from learning might improve an agents’ performance, the agent still needs 
to ensure that each agreement fulfills its goal.  Thus, even though learning-induced performance 
improvement of agents with easy goals might be higher than that with difficult goals, agents with 
easy goals are still expected to have lower individual performance than those with more difficult 
goals.  Based on the discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed and will be tested on both 
individual and dyadic levels.   
 
Individual Level 
GL1)    Agents with learning will have higher individual utilities than those without learning. 
GL2)    Learning will provide a higher increase in individual utility for agents with less  
            difficult goals, as compared to agents with more difficult goals. 
GL3)   When agents learn, the agents with more difficult goals will achieve higher individual  
            utilities than those with less difficult goals. 
 
Dyadic Level 
GL4)    Joint utility with learning will be higher than that in negotiation without learning. 
 
7.6 Experimental Design 
 
7.6.1 Negotiation Scenario 
The negotiation in our experiment deals with a supply chain integration between a supplier and a 
buyer.  Ghodsypour and O’Brien (1998) have identified several supplier-selection criteria.  
Among those criteria, we selected the criteria capability, flexibility, response rate, and defect rate 
as the non-negotiating issues, and price and lead-time as the negotiating issues.  In our 
experiment, all selling agents provided the same service with undifferentiable properties.  The 
possible properties of the chosen non-negotiating criteria and the values on these criteria for the 












Possible Properties Property of Selling 
Service 
Capability Low, High High 
Flexibility Low, Moderate, High Low 
Response Rate Slow, Fast Fast 
Defect Rate 0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5% 0% 
 
Price was the most important negotiating issue for the buying agents while lead time was the 
most important negotiating issue for the selling agents.  In each negotiation, the buying and the 
selling agents negotiated the price and the lead time of the service, until a compromise was made 
or either agent terminated the negotiation because its deadline was reached.  Each agent was 
allowed to complete as many transactions as possible, but the maximum number of turns for 
every agent in every negotiation was 20.  In order to keep consistency between human and 
electronic negotiations, the negotiating ranges of the price and the lead time for both the buying 
and the selling agents were fixed and are given as 
 
Price:  Pmin = 100, Pmax = 300 
Lead-time: LTmin = 10, LTmax = 30 
 
The values of K were fixed at 0.1 for both the price and the lead time of the agents.  In human 
negotiation, different negotiators had different concession behaviors.  We achieved this in 
electronic negotiation by varying the values of β.  The values of β were randomly generated 
within a range from 0.1 to 7.5.  Each agent had a different value of β, but for a given agent, the 
values of β were the same for both the price and the lead time.  In addition, the filtering 
thresholds of all buying agents were fixed at 0.1. 
 
7.6.2 Design for Perceived Power and Learning 
The objective of this experiment is to test the hypotheses P1 to P4 as well as PL1 to PL5.  The 
experimental design was similar to that proposed by Pinkley et al. (1994).  In our experiment, 
three levels of perceived power, low, equal and high, were proposed. 
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According to earlier studies, power can be manipulated in many different forms.  One way to 
manipulate power is the incorporation of a negotiator’s BATNA.  Negotiators are given 
alternatives with certain levels of utilities when they negotiate.  Negotiators with high power 
have BATNA with high utilities.  They might choose to withdraw from negotiations unless the 
utilities of the negotiated agreements are higher than that of their BATNA (Pinkley et al., 1994).  
Another way to manipulate power is to vary the number of buyers and sellers in the market 
(McAlister et al., 1986; Dwyer & Walker, 1981).  When there are fewer buyers than sellers in 
the market, buyers have higher power than sellers have, because sellers need to compete with 
other sellers to make successful agreements while buyers have more options to choose.  
McAlister et al. (1986) has further manipulated the power economically by setting the maximum 
number of transactions that buyers and sellers are allowed to complete.  The smaller the number 
of transactions that a negotiator can make, the higher the power the negotiator has.  However, 
this power manipulation method has been questioned, because power is manipulated as a 
function of individual level behavior instead of market level behavior (Pinkley et al., 1994). 
 
Instead of using perceived final utilities as Pinkley et al. (1994) did, in our experiment, an 
agent’s perception of power is represented by the preference of the market for the attributes of 
the product.  If an agent perceives that the market prefers those attributes, the buyer (seller) has 
low (high) perceived power. 
 
By using such a manipulation of power, a 3 x 3 factorial experimental design was established, 
with three levels of perceived power of both buying and selling agents as two factors.  In each of 
the resulting nine treatment combinations, there were 150 replications, and in each experimental 
replication, there were five buying agents and five selling agents, resulting a total of 25 dyads.  
An overview of the 3 x 3 experimental design is presented in Table 7.3a.  Parameters that were 
held constant in all treatments are given at the bottom of the table. 
 
The preference levels of the buying and the selling agents are presented in Table 7.3b.  Since 
price was the most important issue for the buying agents, the preference level of price of all 
buying agents was set to be seven times more important than that of lead time and that of other 
non-negotiating issues.  The lead time was set to be equally important as the other non-
 79 
negotiating issues.  In addition, the preference level between any two of the attributes from the 
same non-negotiating issue was equally important.  On the other hand, since lead time was the 
most important issue for the selling agents, the preference level of lead time of all selling agents 
was seven times more important than that of price. 
 
The perceived market preferences corresponding to the three levels of perceived power are given 
in Table 7.3c.  With SP 1 (column four), it is perceived that buyers in the market strongly prefer 
a service with high capability, low flexibility, fast response rate, and 0% defect.  Since these are 
the attributes of the selling service as well (column two), buyers in the market are perceived to 
have a higher preference for the selling service, as compared to the neutral preferences in the last 
column.  Thus, buying agents whose perceived market preferences are given by SP 1 have low 
perceived power, while selling agents with a perception of SP 1 have high perceived power. 
 
On the other hand, with SP 3 in column six, it is perceived that buyers in the market do not prefer 
service with high capability, low flexibility, fast response rate, and 0% defect.  A comparison 
with the neutral preferences indicates that buyers in the market are perceived to have a lower 
preference on the selling service.  As a result, buying agents with SP 3 as the perceived market 
preferences have high perceived power, while selling agents which perceive SP 3 have low 
perceived power. 
 
When we compare SP 2 in column five with the neutral preference, the perceived market 
preferences and the preferences of the neutral buyer are the same.  Thus, both buying agents and 
selling agents are said to have equal power when they perceive the market preferences as given 
by SP 2. 
 
The experimental design of investigating the joint effect of power and learning was the same as 
discussed above except for one thing.  In all experimental treatments, both buying and selling 
agents were able to learn. 
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Table 7.3. Complete Experimental Design for Perceived Power and Learning.  
 
Table 7.3a. Overview of the 3 x 3 Experimental Design for Perceived Power and Learning.* 




 High (SP 1) Equal (SP 2) Low (SP 3) 
 
Low (SP 1) Low                 
High  Low                
Equal  Low                 
Low  
Equal (SP 2) Equal                
High Equal               
Eqaul Equal                 
Low 
High (SP 3) High                
High High                
Eqaul High                 
Low 
 
*Parameters common to all treatments are as follows: 
 
β ∈  [0.1, 7.5]    Pmin = 100, Pmax = 300  Max. % of Change of β = 50% 
Tmax = 20    LTmin = 10, LTmin = 30  Filtering Threshold = 0.1 
K = 0.1 for both price and lead-time 
 
Table 7.3b.  Individual Preference Levels among the Criteria. 
Preference Level 
 
Criteria to be Compared 
Buying Agent Selling Agent 
 
Price vs. Lead Time 7 1/7 
Price vs. Any One of the Non-Negotiating Issues 7 -- 
Lead Time vs. Any One of the Non-Negotiating Issues 1 -- 
Between Any Two of the Non-Negotiating Issues 1 -- 








Criteria Properties of 
Selling Service 









High High vs. Low 7 1 1/7 1 
Flexibility Low Low vs. Moderate 
Low vs. High 
 
7 1 1/7 1 
Response Rate 
 
Fast Fast vs. Slow 7 1 1/7 1 
Defect 
 
0% 0% vs. Others 7 1 1/7 1 
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7.6.3 Design for Goal Setting and Learning on Electronic-based Negotiation 
This experiment was designed based on the setting proposed by Huber & Neale (1987).  Four 
levels of goal difficulty were proposed by varying the final thresholds that agents had to achieve 
in their negotiations.  They were do-your-best (non-specific), easy, moderate and difficult goals.  
A 4 x 4 factorial experimental design was established with buying agent’s goal and selling 
agent’s goal as the two factors.  In each of the 16 experimental treatments, there were 150 
experimental replications, and in each experimental replication, there were five buying agents 
and five selling agents, resulting in a total of 25 dyads.  An overview of the 4 x 4 experimental 
design is presented in Table 7.4a.  Parameters that were held constant to all treatments are given 
at the bottom of the table. 
 
The preference levels of the buying and the selling agents are presented in Table 7.4b.  Since 
price was the most important issue for the buying agents, the preference level of price of all 
buying agents was set to be seven times more important than that of the non-negotiating issues.  
For the buying agents, lead-time was the least important issue.  Thus, the preference levels 
between lead time and price as well as between lead time and other non-negotiating issues were 
1/7.  In addition, the preference level between any two of the attributes from the same non-
negotiating issue was equally important.  For the selling agents, the preference level of lead time 
was seven times more important than that of price. 
 
To make our goal-setting manipulation similar to that of Huber & Neale (1986), we set the goal 
difficulty with reference to the joint utility for a fully integrative agreement.  To explain further, 
we first observe that when the final price is $100 and the final lead-time is 10 days, buying 
agents achieve their highest utility (0.9056) and selling agents achieve their lowest utility (0).  
When the final price is $300 and the final lead-time is 30 days, selling agents achieve their 
highest utility (1) and buying agents achieve their lowest utility (0).  Fully integrative agreement 
is reached when the final price is $100 and the final lead-time is 30 days.  Under this condition, 
the joint utility reaches 1.753.  Buying agents achieve a utility of 0.878 while selling agents 
achieve a utility of 0.875.  According to this information, the level of goal difficulty and the 
corresponding range of the final threshold are presented in Table 7.4c.  The final threshold of 
each agent was randomly generated within the defined range. 
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The experimental design of investigating the joint effect of goal setting and learning was the 
same as discussed above except one thing.  In all experimental treatments, both buying and 
selling agents were able to learn. 
 
Table 7.4. Complete Experimental Design for Goal Setting and Learning. 
 
Table 7.4a. Overview of the 4 x 4 Experimental Design for Goal Setting and Learning.* 




 No Goal Easy Moderate Difficult 
 
No Goal No Goal
     No Goal
 No Goal
          Easy
 No Goal
   Moderate
 No Goal









                Easy
 Easy
         Moderate
 Easy





   No Goal
 Moderate




Moderate    
Moderate
   Difficult
 
Difficult Difficult




    
 
      Easy
 Difficult









*Parameters common to all treatments are as follows: 
 
β ∈  [0.1, 7.5]   Pmin = 100, Pmax = 300  LTmin = 10, LTmin = 30  
Tmax = 20   Filtering Threshold = 0.1  K = 0.1 for both price and lead-time 
 
Table 7.4b.  The Individual Preference Levels of both the Buying and the Selling Agents 
Importance Level 
 




Price vs. Lead Time 7 1/7 
Price vs. Any One of the Non-Negotiating Issues 7 -- 
Lead Time vs. Any One of the Non-Negotiating Issues 1/7 -- 
Between Any Two of the Non-Negotiating Issues 1 -- 
Between Any Two of the Attributes from the Same Non-
Negotiating Issue 
1 -- 
   
Table 7.4c. Final Threshold values for the Goal-Setting Manipulation  
Goal Difficulty 
 
Range of Final Threshold 
No Goal 0 
Easy [0.650, 0.700] 
Moderate [0.750, 0.800] 
Difficult [0.850, 0.885] 
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7.6.4 Computation of Performance Measures 
This section describes the exact manner by which the performance measures are computed in the 
experimental designs given in §§7.6.2 and 7.6.3.  We define 
 
N   Number of replications in each experimental treatment 
 
 k   Replication index of the experimental treatment (kth replication) 
 
k
BN  Number of buying agents in the k
th replication of the experimental treatment 
 
k
SN  Number of selling agents in the k
th replication of the experimental treatment 
 
k
NSN  Number of negotiations that has not been started in the k
th replication of the  
  experimental treatment, because of non-fulfillment of the filtering threshold 
 
k
CN  Number of completed negotiations in the k
th replication of the experimental 
treatment 
 
  i   Buying agent number in each replication of the experimental treatment  
  (ith buying agent) 
 
 j   Selling agent number in each replication of the experimental treatment  
       (jth selling agent) 
 
 P  Set of treatments for the power-setting experiment 
  P = {Low, Equal, High}  
 PL Set of treatments for the power-setting-with-learning experiment 
  PL = {Low with Learning, Equal with Learning, High with Learning} 
 G  Set of treatments for the goal-setting experiment 
G = {Non-Specific, Easy, Moderate, Difficult}  
 GL Set of treatments for the goal-setting-with-learning experiment  
GL = {Non-Specific and Learning, Easy and Learning, Moderate and Learning,  
           Difficult and Learning} 
 
The performance measure of each experimental treatment is denoted as PM(b, s), where PM 
stands for one of the performance measures given in Table 7.1, and b and s are the experimental 
conditions of the buying and the selling agents, respectively, as given below. 
 
b, s ∈  P   for power setting experiment, or 
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b, s ∈  PL   for power setting with learning experiment, or 
b, s ∈  G   for goal setting experiment, or 
b, s ∈  GL  for goal setting with learning experiment. 
 













=         (7.3) 
 
where ( )ksbPM ,  represents the performance measure of the kth replication of the experimental 



























, 11         (7.4) 
 
where ( )kijsbPM ,  is the performance measure of the dyad (i, j) at the kth replication, and is 
obtained as given in §7.1.  To avoid biasing the experimental result, we take account of impasse 
rate in utility computation (Tripp & Sondak, 1992).  When agents break off a negotiation, they 
receive zero utilities, as suggested in the literature (Hamner and Harnett, 1974; Pinkley et al., 
1994). 
 
Equation (7.4) is not applicable to the measure of impasse rate, because impasse rate is not 
measured for each dyad.  Instead, the impasse rate of the kth replication of the experimental 






















=,        (7.5) 
 
Since our experiments consist of multiple issues, searching for the Nash solution is a complex 
nonlinear problem.  To simplify this, we estimate the Nash solution by enumerating over the 
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feasible ranges of the price and the lead time for each negotiation, and compute the joint utility 
for each possible combination.  We then take the agreement with the highest joint utility as the 




8 Results for Power Setting Experiment 
 
In §7.6.2, we discussed the experimental design for testing the effects of situational power and 
learning on electronic negotiation.  In this chapter, we conduct the experiment, and present the 
associated results and discussions.   
 
For the nine-treatment experiment without learning, the average values of the buying agent’s 
utility, the selling agent’s utility, the joint utility, the number of turns and the distance to Nash 
are shown in Table 8.1.  When both buying agents and selling agents agree on their perceptions 
of the market’s preferences, the average number of turns to reach agreements is around seven for 
our experimental setting.  Buying agents achieve the highest individual utility (M = 0.49), when 
both parties agree that buyers in the market do not like the product.  Selling agents achieve the 
highest individual utility (M = 0.65), when both parties agree that buyers in the market like the 
product.  In addition, when the perception of power of one party increases while that of the other 
party remains unchanged, individual utility increases for the party with increasing power.   
 
The average performance measures for the nine experimental treatments with learning are given 
in Table 8.2.  A similar pattern is obtained when compared with Table 8.1.  Again, buying agents 
achieve the highest individual utility (M = 0.50), when both parties agree that buyers in the 
market do not like the product, while selling agents achieve the highest individual utility (M = 
0.71), when both parties agree that buyers in the market like the product.  Similarly, when both 
agents learn, the higher the power a party perceives, the higher the individual utility the party 
achieves, when the perceived power of the other party remains unchanged.  By comparing the 
performance measures between the learning and no-learning situations, we see that agents with 
learning achieve higher individual utilities, higher joint utilities and fairer agreements.  With 
these observations, we now proceed to test the hypotheses given in §§7.2 and 7.3. 
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Table 8.1. Results for Various Treatment Combinations of Perceived Power without 
Learning. 
Selling Agent’s Power (s) 
High Power (SP 1) Equal Power (SP 2) Low Power (SP 3) Buying Agent’s 
Power (b) 
Performance 
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
BU(b, s) 0.36 0.03 0.41 0.03 0.44 0.03 
SU(b, s) 0.65 0.07 0.54 0.07 0.46 0.07 
JU(b, s) 1.01 0.04 0.94 0.04 0.90 0.04 
NT(b, s) 7.26 1.28 5.92 1.10 5.14 0.99 
Low Power  
(SP 1) 
DN(b, s) 0.25 0.07 0.35 0.07 0.42 0.07 
 
BU(b, s) 0.39 0.03 0.43 0.03 0.46 0.03 
SU(b, s) 0.59 0.07 0.47 0.07 0.40 0.07 
JU(b, s) 0.98 0.05 0.90 0.05 0.86 0.04 
NT(b, s) 8.58 1.35 6.90 1.21 5.90 1.15 
Equal Power 
(SP 2) 
DN(b, s) 0.30 0.07 0.41 0.07 0.48 0.07 
 
BU(b, s) 0.42 0.03 0.47 0.03 0.49 0.02 
SU(b, s) 0.49 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.32 0.06 
JU(b, s) 0.92 0.05 0.85 0.04 0.81 0.04 
NT(b, s) 10.52 1.43 8.29 1.39 7.00 1.34 
High Power  
(SP 3) 
DN(b, s) 0.40 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.56 0.06 
 
Table 8.2. Results for Various Treatment Combinations of Perceived Power with Learning. 
Selling Agent’s Power (s) 
High Power (SP 1) Equal Power (SP 2) Low Power (SP 3) Buying Agent’s 
Power (b) 
Performance 
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
BU(b, s) 0.40 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.45 0.43 
SU(b, s) 0.71 0.06 0.58 0.07 0.50 0.58 
JU(b, s) 1.11 0.04 1.01 0.05 0.94 1.01 
NT(b, s) 12.01 2.04 8.92 2.25 7.27 8.92 
Low Power  
(SP 1) 
DN(b, s) 0.23 0.04 0.32 0.05 0.40 0.32 
 
BU(b, s) 0.43 0.02 0.45 0.02 0.47 0.43 
SU(b, s) 0.69 0.06 0.55 0.08 0.46 0.69 
JU(b, s) 1.12 0.05 1.01 0.06 0.93 1.12 
NT(b, s) 13.81 1.72 10.55 2.21 8.59 13.81 
Equal Power 
(SP 2) 
DN(b, s) 0.23 0.05 0.34 0.06 0.43 0.23 
 
BU(b, s) 0.45 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.50 0.45 
SU(b, s) 0.65 0.08 0.51 0.08 0.41 0.65 
JU(b, s) 1.11 0.06 1.00 0.07 0.91 1.11 
NT(b, s) 15.57 1.39 12.67 2.05 10.46 15.57 
High Power  
(SP 3) 
DN(b, s) 0.25 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.47 0.25 
Note:  BU stands for buyer’s IU, and SU stands for seller’s IU 









8.1 Effect of Perceived Power 
 
Individual Performance 
Hypothesis P1. (Higher-Power Agent’s IU > Lower-Power Agent’s IU)  We test the effect of 
perceived power on average individual utility per transaction by the regression equation: 
 
AVG_UTILITY = λ0 + λ1ROLE + λ2POWER + ε 
 
where AVG_UTILITY is the kth replication’s average utility, IU(b, s)k, for b, s ∈  P, ROLE is the 
buyer (seller) if IU stands for the buyer’s (seller’s) IU, POWER is the perceived power given by 
b (s) if IU stands for the buyer’s (seller’s) IU, λ0, λ1 and λ2 are the regression coefficients, and ε 
is the error term that is normally distributed with the mean.  POWER is a dummy variable coded 
as 1 for low, 2 for equal, and 3 for high.  In all, there are  1350 values of buyer’s IUs (= 150 
replications/treatment x 9 treatments) and 1350 values of seller’s IUs, and by using these values, 
we find the regression equation as: 
 
AVG_UTILITY = 0.311 + 0.04767ROLE + 0.05904POWER + ε 
               (p < 0.0005)         (p < 0.0005) 
 
The equation is significant (p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.329)2.  As the coefficient of the POWER variable 
is positive and significant, the average individual utility per transaction increases as the level of 
power increases.  The ROLE variable is also significant, because buying and selling agents have 
different payoff tables in this experiment.   
 
We further test this hypothesis by comparing the individual utilities among agents with three 
levels of power.  These treatments corresponding to different power settings are: 
 
Low-Power Agents: {(b, s) | b = Low, s ∈  P}    for buyer (8.1a) 
   {(b, s) | b ∈  P, s = Low}    for seller  (8.1b) 
 
 
                                                        
2 Discussion for a low value of R2 in this hypothesis and the other hypotheses is presented in §8.3 
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Equal-Power Agents: {(b, s) | b = Equal, s ∈  P}    for buyer (8.2a) 
   {(b, s) | b ∈  P, s = Equal}    for seller  (8.2b) 
 
 
High-Power Agents: {(b, s) | b = High, s ∈  P}    for buyer (8.3a) 
   {(b, s) | b ∈  P, s = High}    for seller  (8.3b) 
 
where each tuple (b, s) in the above equations consists of 150 replications, and represents an 
experimental treatment in Table 8.1. 
 
There are 450 values of IUs (= 150 replications x 3 treatments of power level) for each of (8.1a) 
through (8.3b).  Thus, each power level in the ANOVA test contains 900 values.  We observe 
significant differences among the average individual utilities corresponding to the three power 
levels (p < 0.0005).  The results are presented in Tables 8.3.  Post-hoc results in Table 8.4 further 
show that agents with high power (M = 0.5169) achieve significantly higher individual utilities 
than agents with equal power (M = 0.4439, p < 0.0005), while agents with equal power achieve 
significantly higher individual utilities than agents with low power (M = 0.3988, p < 0.0005).  
Overall, this hypothesis is supported. 
 
Table 8.3. Individual Utilities for the Power-and-No-Learning Environment. 




Note: Individual utilities among three levels of power are found to be significant (p < 0.0005). 
 
Table 8.4. Post-hoc Results for Individual Utilities for the Power-and-No-Learning 
Environment. 
Comparisons p-value 
Low vs. Equal < 0.0005 
Low vs. High < 0.0005 




Hypothesis P2. (Balanced Power Agreement’s JU > Imbalanced Power Agreement’s JU) 
Balanced power agreements consist of those treatments where both agents perceive the same 
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level of power, while in an imbalanced power agreement, one party perceives higher power than 
the other party does.  They are given by: 
 
Balanced Power Agreements:  {(b, s) | b = s for b, s ∈  P}    (8.4) 
Imbalanced Power Agreements: {(b, s) | b ≠ s for b, s ∈  P}    (8.5) 
 
 
We further divide (8.5) into two groups as given by 
 
Imbalanced Power Favoring Buyers: {(b, s) | b > s for b, s ∈  P}    (8.5a) 
Imbalanced Power Favoring Sellers: {(b, s) | b < s for b, s ∈  P}     (8.5b) 
 
With 150 experimental replications in each tuple (b, s), there are 450 values of JUs in (8.4) (= 
150 x 3 balanced power treatments) and 900 values (= 150 x 6 imbalanced power treatments) in 
(8.5); (8.5a) and (8.5b) consist of 450 values.   
 
Table 8.5 shows the JUs for the treatments with imbalanced power agreements.  Results from a t-
test indicates that there is no significant difference between (8.4) and (8.5).  However, when we 
only compare the balanced power agreements with the imbalanced power agreements in (8.5b), 
we observe that the joint utilities in the former one are significantly lower (p < 0.0005).  On the 
other hand, the balanced power agreements have significantly higher joint utilities than those 
agreements with imbalanced power favoring buyers (p < 0.0005).  Since the decrease in the joint 
utilities from the agreements with imbalanced power favoring sellers is cancelled out by the 
increase in the joint utilities from the agreements with imbalanced power favoring buyers, there 
is no significant difference in the joint utilities between the balanced and the imbalanced power 
agreements.  Hence, this proposition is partially supported. 
 
Table 8.5. Joint Utilities of Imbalanced Power Agreements. 
Balanced versus Joint Utility t-test  
p-value 
Imbalanced 0.9067 0.834 
Imbalanced Favoring Sellers 0.9756 < 0.0005 
Imbalanced Favoring Buyers 0.8377 < 0.0005 
Note: Mean JU for Balanced Power Agreements is 0.9058. 
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Hypothesis P3. (Self and Competitor’s Power have a Positive and Additive Effect on NT) We test 
the effect of perceived power on the number of turns by the regression equation: 
 
AVG_TURNS = λ0  + λ1BPOWER + λ2SPOWER + λ3POWER_INT + ε 
 
where AVG_TURNS is the kth replication’s average number of turns, NT(b, s)k, for b, s ∈  P, 
BPOWER and SPOWER are dummy variables for the buyer’s and seller’s perceived powers (b 
and s), and POWER_INT is the interaction between the two dummy variables.  This means that 
there are 1350 values of NTs (= 150 x 9 treatments).  We find the regression equation as: 
 
AVG_TURNS = 3.420 + 0.543BPOWER + 0.681SPOWER + 0.353POWER_INT + ε 
              (p < 0.0005)      (p < 0.0005)    (p < 0.0005) 
 
The equation is significant (p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.596).  The coefficients of BPOWER and 
SPOWER dummy variables are positive and significant.  This hypothesis is supported. 
 
Hypothesis P4. (Balanced Power Agreement’s DN < Imbalanced Power Agreement’s DN) To 
test this proposition, we compare the distance to Nash for (8.4) with that for (8.5).  The smaller 
the distance to Nash, the fairer the agreement.  Among nine experimental treatments, the three 
treatments consisting of balanced power agreements yield an average distance to Nash of 0.4139.  
Table 8.6 shows the distances to Nash for treatments consisting of imbalanced power 
agreements.  Results from t-tests indicate that there is no significant difference in the distances to 
Nash between the two treatments.   
 
However, when we compare the treatments consisting of balanced power agreements with the 
treatments where the selling agents perceive higher power, we observe that the distances to Nash 
in the former one are significantly higher (p < 0.0005).  On the other hand, the treatments 
consisting of balanced power agreements have significantly lower distances to Nash than those 
treatments where the buying agents perceive higher power (p < 0.0005).  That is, in the overall 
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imbalanced power treatments, an increase in the distance to Nash for treatments favoring sellers 
cancels out the decrease in the distance for treatments favoring buyers.   
 
In summary, although there appears to have no difference between balanced and imbalanced 
power treatments, balanced power agreements are fairer than imbalanced ones favoring buyers.  
Thus, this proposition is only partially supported. 
 
Table 8.6. Distances to Nash of Imbalanced Power Agreements. 
Balanced versus Distance to Nash t-test  
p-value 
Imbalanced 0.4084 0.415 
Imbalanced Favoring Sellers 0.3001 < 0.0005 
Imbalanced Favoring Buyers 0.5168 < 0.0005 
Note: Mean Distance to Nash for Balanced Power agreements is 0.4139. 
 
8.2 Joint Effect of Perceived Power and Learning 
 
Individual Performance 
Hypothesis PL1. (IU of Agents with Learning > IU of Agents without Learning) To test this 
proposition, we employ a t-test and regression analysis, and the results from both tests support 
the hypothesis.  First, we compare the individual utilities between agents with and without 
learning using a t-test.  These agents are given by: 
 
Agents without Learning: {(b, s) | b, s ∈  P}      (8.6) 
Agents with Learning:  {(b, s) | b, s ∈  PL}      (8.7) 
 
There are 2700 values of IUs for each of (8.6) and (8.7).  Results indicate that agents with 
learning achieve significantly higher individual utilities (M = 0.5076) than those without learning 
(M = 0.4532, p < 0.0005).  
 





AVG_UTILITY = λ0 + λ1ROLE + λ2POWER + λ3LEARNING  +  
       λ4POWER_LEARNING_INT + ε 
 
where AVG_UTILITY is the kth replication’s average individual utility, IU(b, s)k, for b, s ∈  P ∪  
PL, LEARNING indicates whether the agent learns or not, POWER_LEARNING_INT is the 
interaction between power and learning, and other dummy variables are defined in the same way 
as before.  We find the regression equation as: 
 
AVG_UTILITY = 0.284 + 0.08050ROLE + 0.04818POWER + 0.03265LEARNING  
              (p < 0.0005)      (p < 0.0005)       (p < 0.0005) 
                      + 0.01086POWER_LEARNING_INT + ε 
                   (p < 0.0005)   
            
This equation is significant (p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.476), and the coefficient of the LEARNING 
dummy variable is positive and significant as well.  In sum, this proposition is supported. 
 
Hypothesis PL2. (Higher-Power Agents have Higher Increase in Utility from Learning) To test 
this proposition, we first compare the individual utilities between agents with and without 
learning when these agents have different levels of perceived power.  Agents with learning and 
different levels of perceived power are given by: 
 
Low-Power Agents with Learning: {(b, s) | b = Low with Learning, s ∈  PL}    for buyer (8.8a) 
{(b, s) | b ∈  PL, s = Low with Learning}    for seller  (8.8b) 
 
Equal-Power Agents with Learning: {(b, s) | b = Equal with Learning, s ∈  PL}  for buyer (8.9a) 
{(b, s) | b ∈  PL, s = Equal with Learning}  for seller  (8.9b) 
 
High-Power Agents with Learning: {(b, s) | b = High with Learning, s ∈  PL}   for buyer (8.10a) 
{(b, s) | b ∈  PL, s = High with Learning}   for seller  (8.10b) 
 
where each tuple (b, s) in the above equations represents the experimental treatment in Table 8.2, 
and consists of 150 experimental replications.   
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First, we investigate if learning can improve individual utilities for agents with different levels of 
perceived power.  We conducted t-tests to compare the individual utilities between (8.1a ∪  8.1b) 
and (8.8a ∪  8.8b), (8.2a ∪  8.2b) and (8.9a ∪  8.9b), and (8.3a ∪  8.3b) and (8.10a ∪  8.10b).  The 
results are presented in Table 8.7.  We observe that agents with low power, equal power, and 
high power all achieve significantly higher individual utilities when they learn. 
 
Table 8.7. Effect of Learning on Individual Utilities at Different Levels of Perceived Power. 
Individual Utility Perceived 
Power 
Without Learning With Learning 
Average Increase t-test 
p-value 
Low 0.3988 0.4417 0.0429 < 0.0005 
Equal 0.4439 0.4996 0.0557 0.001 
High 0.5169 0.5815 0.0646 < 0.0005 
 
Next, we test if the increases in utilities are different among the three power levels.  We 
conducted a 2 x 3 two-way ANOVA test that consists of agents with and without learning at 
three different levels of perceived power.  We compare the increases in individual utilities for 
the three levels of power.  The results are presented in Figure 8.1, and indicate an interaction 


































Figure 8.1. Interaction Effect of Learning and Power Perception on Individual Utility. 
 
That is, when agents learn, agents with high power achieve higher increases in individual utilities 
(M = 0.0646) than agents with equal power (M = 0.0557), while agents with equal power achieve 
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higher increases in individual utilities than those with low power (M = 0.0429).  In sum, this 
hypothesis is supported. 
 
Hypothesis PL3. (When Agents Learn, Higher-Power Agent’s IU > Lower-Power Agent’s IU) To 
test this hypothesis, we compare the individual utilities among low-power agents with learning 
(8.8a ∪  8.8b), equal-power agents with learning (8.9a ∪  8.9b), and high-power agents with 
learning (8.10a ∪  8.10b).  A one-way ANOVA test indicates significant difference among these 
agents (p < 0.0005), and the results are presented in Table 8.8.  Post-hoc results in Table 8.9 
further show that when agents learn, the individual utilities of high-power agents (M = 0.5815) 
are significantly higher than those of equal-power agents (M = 0.4995, p < 0.0005), and those of 
low-power agents (M = 0.4417, p < 0.0005).  When equal-power agents are compared with low-
power agents, equal-power agents achieve significantly higher individual utilities.  Overall, this 
hypothesis is supported. 
 
Table 8.8. Individual Utilities for Three Levels of Power in Learning Environment. 




Note: Individual utilities among three levels of power are found to be significant (p < 0.0005). 
 
Table 8.9. Post-hoc Results for Individual Utilities at Three Levels of Power in Learning 
Environment. 
Comparisons p-value 
Low vs. Equal < 0.0005 
Low vs. High < 0.0005 




Hypothesis PL4. (JU of Agreements with Learning > JU of Agreements without Learning, and 
DN of Agreements with Learning < DN of Agreements without Learning) When agents learn, 
balanced power agreements and imbalanced power agreements are given by: 
 
Balanced Power Treatments with Learning:  {(b, s) | b = s for b, s ∈  PL}  (8.11) 
Imbalanced Power Treatments with Learning: {(b, s) | b ≠ s for b, s ∈  PL}  (8.12) 
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Since there are 150 experimental replications for each tuple in the above equations, there are  
450 values of JUs and DNs (= 150 x 3 balanced power treatments) for (8.11), and 900 values of 
JUs and DNs (= 150 x 6 imbalanced power treatments) for (8.12).  To test this hypothesis, we 
compare the joint utilities and the distances to Nash for (8.4) vs. (8.11) and for (8.5) vs. (8.12). 
 
We observe that balanced power agreements with learning have significantly higher joint utilities 
(M = 1.0197) and lower distances to Nash (M = 0.3311) than those without learning (M = 0.9058, 
p < 0.0005 for JU, and M = 0.4139, p < 0.0005 for DN).  In imbalanced power conditions, 
agreements with learning also have significantly higher joint utilities (M = 1.0129) and lower 
distances to Nash (M = 0.3425) than those without learning (M = 0.9067, p < 0.0005 for JU, and 
M = 0.4084, p < 0.0005 for DN).  On the whole, this proposition is supported. 
 




Power Perception No Learning Learning T-test p-value 
Balanced 0.9058 1.0197 < 0.0005 Joint Utility 
Imbalanced 0.9067 1.0129 < 0.0005 
Balanced 0.4139 0.3311 < 0.0005 Distance to Nash 




8.3.1 Effect of Perceived Power 
A summary of the results of the effect of perceived power on electronic negotiation outcome is 
presented in Table 8.11, wherein the shaded portion indicates hypotheses that are not fully 
supported.  According to our results, negotiation agents with higher (lower) perceived power 
achieve higher (lower) utilities, but take longer (less) time to reach agreements.  This implies that 
there is a trade-off between performance and time when we integrate situational power in 
electronic negotiation. 
 
Dwyer & Walker (1981), and McAlister et al. (1986) found that the joint utility in an imbalanced 
power situation is lower than that in a balanced power situation.  On the other hand, Pinkley et 
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al. (1994) proposed that the joint utility is higher in an imbalanced power situation.  Our results 
indicate that there is no significant difference in the joint utilities between balanced and 
imbalanced power agreements.  According to Table 8.8, when selling agents perceive higher 
power than buying agents do, the joint utilities increase when compared with the joint utilities in 
balanced power conditions.  In another case, when buying agents perceive higher power than 
selling agents do, the joint utilities decrease when compared with the joint utilities in balanced 
power conditions.  Although our results are not totally consistent with the findings from Dwyer 
& Walker (1981) and McAlister et al. (1986), our results do not support the proposition from 
Pinkley et al. (1994) either. 
 
The discrepancy is caused by the difference in the payoff tables between the buying and the 
selling agents.  To compute utilities, buying agents incorporate the values of both the negotiating 
and the non-negotiating issues, but selling agents consider the negotiating issues only.  In 
addition, there is only one type of product for buying agents to choose, while selling agents can 
sell their products to any buying agent.  Thus, sellers have an advantage, and hence, perceived 
power has a greater effect on selling agents than on buying agents.  In other words, selling agents 
with high-perceived power achieve higher increases in utilities than buying agents with high-
perceived power.  This explains why the joint utilities increase when selling agents have higher 
perceived power than buying agents do.  Because of this, when selling agents have higher 
perceived power, agreements become more integrative, and the joint utilities approach closer to 
the integrative level.  Thus, the distances to Nash decrease.  This explains why agreements 
become fairer when selling agents have higher perceived power. 
 
Finally, we observe that in some cases, the value of R2 is our regression equation is 
comparatively low, especially when we deal with the utility of a negotiation.  An explanation for 
this is that agents have different concession behaviors in our experiment.  According to our 
design, we vary the value of β from 0.1 to 7.5 for each of the three levels of power.  Faratin et al. 
(1997) have determined that this variation can affect an agent’s negotiation performance. 
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Table 8.11. Summary of the Effects of Perceived Power on Electronic Negotiation 
Outcome. 






P1 Agents with higher perceived 
power will have higher individual 
utilities than those with lower 
perceived power. 
 
Supported Pinkley et al. 
(1994) 
Dwyer & Walker 
(1981) 




P2 Joint utility in a balanced power 
condition will be higher than that 





Dwyer & Walker 
(1981) 
McAlister et al. 
(1986) 
Pinkley et al. 
(1994) 
P3 The levels of perceived power of 
both agents will have a positive 
and additive effect on the time to 
reach agreements 
 
Supported Dwyer & Walker 
(1981) 
None 
P4 Distance to Nash solution in a 
balanced power condition will be 








8.3.2 Joint Effect of Perceived Power and Learning 
Table 8.12 presents the summary of the results of the joint effect of perceived power and 
learning on electronic negotiation outcome.  Our heuristic algorithms for learning are found to be 
effective for agents with low, equal, and high perceived power.  Higher individual utilities are 
achieved when agents learn.  Moreover, in both balanced and imbalanced power conditions, 
agreements become more integrative and fairer when agents carry out the proposed learning 
algorithms.  In general, learning is beneficial for agents, irrespective of their levels of power 
perception. 
 
We also observe that learning provides a higher increase in individual utility for agents with 
higher power, when compared to agents with lower power.  This implies that learning is more 
effective for high-power agents than for low-power agents in electronic negotiation.   
 
When learning is implemented, we see that agents with higher power achieve higher utilities than 
those with lower power.  Although we find that learning is effective in improving the individual 
performance of an agent, situational power remains in effect when agents learn.  Thus, we 
suggest incorporating situational power into agents, even agents learn, and vice versa. 
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Table 8.12. Summary of the Joint Effect of Perceived Power and Learning on Electronic 
Negotiation Outcome.  








PL1 Agents with learning will have 
higher individual utilities than 
those without learning. 
 
 
Supported Zeng & Sycara 
(1998) 
Deveaux et al. 
(2001) 
None 
PL2 Learning will provide a higher 
increase in individual utility for 
agents with higher power, as 
compared to agents with lower 
power. 
 
Supported None None 
PL3 When learning is implemented, 
agents with higher power will 
have higher individual utilities 
than those with low power. 
 
Supported None None 
PL4 In both balanced and imbalanced 
power conditions, agreements 
with learning will have higher 
joint utilities, and lower 
distances to Nash than those 
without learning. 
 
Supported Zeng & Sycara 
(1998) supported 






9 Results for Goal Setting Experiment 
 
In Chapter 8, we discussed the effects of situational power and learning on electronic 
negotiation.  In this chapter, with the experimental design in §7.6.3, we conduct the experiment 
to test the effect of goal constraints on electronic negotiation.  Also, we present results and 
discussion. 
 
For the 16 goal-setting combinations without learning, Table 9.1 shows the average values of the 
buying agent’s utility, the selling agent’s utility, the joint utility, the number of turns and the 
impasse rate.  Generally, as the difficulty of an agent’s goal increases, a higher individual utility 
is achieved, but a longer time is required and a higher impasse rate is expected.  Joint utility is 
the highest when selling agents have a difficult goal while buying agents have a moderate goal.  
The joint utility (M = 1.72) is just slightly below the integrative level (M = 1.75).  The dyad 
involving both agents with non-specific goals approaches the joint utility (M = 1.11), which is 
the lowest among the 16 experimental treatments.  In addition, when agent goals are 
homogeneous, highest joint utility (M = 1.65) is achieved when both agents have moderate goals.  
Furthermore, buying agents achieve the highest individual utility (M = 0.87), when they have a 
difficult goal while selling agents have a non-specific goal.  Similarly, selling agents achieve the 
highest individual utility (M = 0.88), when they have a difficult goal while buying agents have a 
non-specific goal.  Impasse rate (M = 35.79%) and the number of turns (M = 17.62) are the 
highest when both agents have difficult goals.   
 
The average performance measures for the treatments with learning are given in Table 9.2.  A 
similar pattern is obtained when compared with Table 9.1.  Joint utility is still the highest when 
selling agents have a difficult goal while buying agents have a moderate goal (M = 1.72).  Also, 
with homogeneous goals, dyad approaches the highest joint utility (M = 1.66) when both agents 
have moderate goals.  In addition, buying agents achieve the highest individual utility (M = 
0.87), when they have a difficult goal while selling agents have a non-specific goal.  Similarly, 
selling agents achieve the highest individual utility (M = 0.90), when they have a difficult goal 
while buying agents have a non-specific goal.  Highest impasse rate (M = 36.00%) and highest 
number of turns (M = 17.81) are observed when both agents have difficult goals.   
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Table 9.1. Results for Various Combinations of Goal without Learning. 
 
Table 9.2. Results for Various Combinations of Goal with Learning. 
Selling Agent’s Goal (s) 













BU(b, s) 0.63 0.05 0.71 0.06 0.73 0.07 0.73 0.08 
SU(b, s) 0.48 0.08 0.76 0.04 0.83 0.02 0.90 0.02 
JU(b, s) 1.11 0.03 1.47 0.03 1.56 0.05 1.63 0.06 
NT(b, s) 6.87 1.21 11.56 1.78 12.91 1.72 16.47 1.32 
Non-
Specific  
IR(b, s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
BU(b, s) 0.75 0.03 0.78 0.03 0.79 0.04 0.81 0.03 
SU(b, s) 0.56 0.11 0.76 0.04 0.82 0.02 0.88 0.09 
JU(b, s) 1.31 0.08 1.54 0.01 1.61 0.02 1.69 0.02 
NT(b, s) 10.51 1.85 12.72 1.81 13.75 1.70 16.77 1.24 
Easy 
IR(b, s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
BU(b, s) 0.81 0.0156 0.82 0.02 0.83 0.02 0.84 0.02 
SU(b, s) 0.61 0.1107 0.77 0.04 0.82 0.02 0.88 0.01 
JU(b, s) 1.42 0.0967 1.59 0.02 1.65 0.01 1.72 0.01 
NT(b, s) 12.11 1.89 13.61 1.77 14.39 1.66 17.00 1.18 
Moderate 
IR(b, s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
BU(b, s) 0.87 0.01 0.86 0.03 0.77 0.13 0.56 0.18 
SU(b, s) 0.72 0.09 0.78 0.05 0.73 0.13 0.56 0.18 
JU(b, s) 1.59 0.09 1.65 0.08 1.50 0.26 1.12 0.35 
NT(b, s) 15.82 1.50 16.40 1.36 16.59 1.32 17.62 1.25 
Difficult 
IR(b, s) 0.00 0.00 0.91 3.83 11.44 14.95 35.79 20.39 
Selling Agent’s Goal (s) 













BU(b, s) 0.69 0.08 0.72 0.06 0.73 0.06 0.73 0.08 
SU(b, s) 0.55 0.19 0.80 0.03 0.84 0.02 0.90 0.02 
JU(b, s) 1.24 0.17 1.52 0.04 1.57 0.04 1.63 0.06 
NT(b, s) 9.79 4.80 13.13 1.83 13.91 1.73 16.69 1.26 
Non-
Specific  
IR(b, s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
BU(b, s) 0.80 0.02 0.81 0.02 0.81 0.03 0.78 0.02 
SU(b, s) 0.61 0.08 0.77 0.03 0.83 0.02 0.89 0.01 
JU(b, s) 1.41 0.07 1.58 0.02 1.64 0.02 1.67 0.01 
NT(b, s) 12.85 1.95 14.16 1.81 14.75 1.66 19.21 0.32 
Easy 
IR(b, s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
BU(b, s) 0.84 0.01 0.84 0.01 0.84 0.01 0.84 0.01 
SU(b, s) 0.63 0.03 0.79 0.03 0.83 0.02 0.88 0.06 
JU(b, s) 1.62 0.02 1.62 0.02 1.66 0.01 1.72 0.01 
NT(b, s) 14.84 1.72 14.84 1.72 15.24 1.65 17.29 1.12 
Moderate 
IR(b, s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
BU(b, s) 0.87 0.01 0.86 0.05 0.77 0.14 0.56 0.18 
SU(b, s) 0.71 0.08 0.78 0.06 0.73 0.13 0.56 0.18 
JU(b, s) 1.58 0.08 1.64 0.10 1.50 0.27 1.11 0.36 
NT(b, s) 16.32 1.38 16.95 1.24 16.93 1.26 17.81 1.22 
Difficult 
IR(b, s) 0.43 1.61 1.49 5.29 12.13 15.56 36.00 20.46 
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The lowest joint utility (M = 1.11) is, however, obtained when both agents have difficult goals.  
Learning seems to be effective in improving both individual and joint utilities in the power-effect 
experiment.  Here, a comparison between the learning and no-learning situations indicates that 
learning is effective on agents with non-specific, easy and moderate goals, but not on agents with 
difficult goals.  Generally, when agents learn, those with more difficult goals achieve higher 
individual utilities than those with less difficult goals, except in the situation where both agents 
have difficult goals.  Learning seems to help agents to achieve higher individual utilities and 
higher joint utilities, while the goal difficulty remains in effect in both learning and no-learning 
environments.  With these observations, we now proceed to test the hypotheses given in §§7.4 
and 7.5. 
 
9.1 Effect of Goal Setting 
 
Individual Performance 
Hypothesis G1. (IR has a Positive and Linear Dependence on Goal Difficulty) We test the effect 
of goal difficulty on impasse rate by the regression equation: 
 
IR = λ0 + λ1BGOAL + λ2SGOAL + ε 
 
where IR is the kth replication’s average impasse rate, IR(b, s)k, for b, s ∈  G, and BGOAL and 
SGOAL are b and s, respectively.  BGOAL and SGOAL are dummy variables coded as 0 for 
non-specific, 1 for easy, 2 for moderate, and 3 for difficult.  There are 2400 values of IRs (= 150 
replications/treatment x 16 treatments), and using these IRs, we find the regression equation as 
 
IR = -6.828 +3.610BGOAL + 2.947SGOAL + ε 
              (p < 0.0005)      (p < 0.0005) 
 
The value of R2 of this equation is 0.227, which is low.  An explanation might be that impasse 
rates are often equal to or close to zero, as agents are assigned no goals, easy goals or moderate 
goals (See Table 9.1).  We only observe significant impasse rate (35.79%), in the situation when 
both agents are assigned difficult goals.  Thus, for this setting, IR has a weak linear dependence 
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on goal difficulty on agents with no goals, easy goals or moderate goals.  According to the 
regression equation, the coefficients of BGOAL and SGOAL dummy variables are positive and 
significant.  In addition, the coefficient of the BGOAL variable is greater than that of the 
SGOAL variable.  The buying agent’s goal has greater effect on impasse rate than the selling 
agent’s goal.  In sum, this hypothesis is supported. 
 
Hypothesis G2. (IU of Specific-Goal Agents > IU of Non-Specific-Goal Agents) Agents with 
non-specific goals and agents with specific goals are given by: 
 
Agents with Non-Specific Goal: {(b, s) | b = Non-Specific, s ∈  G} for buyer (9.1a) 
{(b, s) | b ∈  G, s = Non-Specific} for seller (9.1b) 
 
Agents with Specific Goal:  {(b, s) | b ≠ Non-Specific, s ∈  G} for buyer (9.2a) 
{(b, s) | b ∈  G, s ≠ Non-Specific} for seller (9.2b) 
 
where each tuple (b, s) in the above equations represents the experimental treatment in Table 9.1, 
and consists of 150 replications. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we compare the IUs for (9.1a ∪  9.1b) with those of (9.2a ∪  9.2b).  There 
are 1200 IUs (= 150 x 4 treatments x 2 for buyer/seller) for non-specific goals and 3600 IUs (= 
150 x 12 treatments x 2 for buyer/seller) for specific goals.  By conducting a t-test, we observe 
that agents with specific goals achieve significantly higher individual utilities (M = 0.7912) than 
those with non-specific goals (M = 0.6456, p < 0.0005).  Thus, this hypothesis is supported. 
 
Hypothesis G3. (IU has a Positive and Linear Dependence on Goal Difficulty) We compare the 
individual utilities among agents with easy, moderate and difficult goals.  These agents are given 
by: 
 
Agents with Easy Goals:  {(b, s) | b = Easy, s ∈  G}  for buyer (9.3a) 
 {(b, s) | b ∈  G, s = Easy}  for seller (9.3b) 
 
Agents with Moderate Goals:  {(b, s) | b = Moderate, s ∈  G} for buyer (9.4a) 




Agents with Difficult Goals:  {(b, s) | b = Difficult, s ∈  G}  for buyer (9.5a) 
 {(b, s) | b ∈  G, s = Difficult}  for seller (9.5b) 
 
There are 600 values of buyer’s IUs (= 150 x 4 treatments with each goal), and 600 values of 
seller’s IUs for each of (9.3a ∪  9.3b), (9.4a ∪  9.4b) and (9.5a ∪  9.5b).  A one-way ANOVA test 
indicates significant difference in the individual utilities among these agents, and the results are 
presented in Table 9.3.   
 
In another case, we modify our test by excluding the treatment in which both agents have 
difficult goals.  This means that the tuple (b, s) for b = Difficult, s = Difficult, is not included in 
(9.5a ∪  9.5b).  The reason to do this is to test if the high impasse rate in the difficult-difficult 
goal treatment has an effect on this hypothesis.  Under this condition, we observe that significant 
changes do result from this exclusion.  
 
Post-hoc results in Table 9.4 indicate that when the difficult-difficult goal treatment is taken into 
account, the individual utilities of agents with moderate goals (M = 0.8118) are significantly 
higher than those of agents with easy goals (M = 0.7764, p < 0.0005), but the individual utilities 
of agents with difficult goals (M = 0.7854) are significantly lower than those of agents with 
moderate goals (M = 0.7764, p < 0.0005).  In addition, there is no significant difference in 
individual utilities between agents with easy and difficult goals.  Based on this finding, the 
hypothesis is only partially supported. 
 
When the difficult-difficult goal treatment is not included, post-hoc results indicate that agents 
with difficult goals achieve significantly higher individual utilities (M = 0.8608) than agents with 
moderate goals (M = 0.8118, p < 0.0005), and agents with moderate goals also achieve 










Table 9.3. Individual Utilities of Agents with Different Goals in No-Learning Environment. 
Situation Agent’s Goal Individual 
Utility 
 
ANOVA test  
p-value 
Easy 0.7764 
Moderate 0.8118 All Treatments 
Difficult 0.7854 
< 0.0005 
    
Easy 0.7764 
Moderate 0.8118 
All Treatments except Difficult-
Difficult Goal treatment 
Difficult 0.8608 
< 0.0005 
    
 
 





Easy vs. Moderate < 0.0005 
Easy vs. Difficult 0.097 All Treatments 
 
Moderate vs. Difficult < 0.0005 
   
Easy vs. Moderate < 0.0005 
Easy vs. Difficult < 0.0005 
All Treatments except Difficult-
Difficult Goal treatment 
Moderate vs. Difficult < 0.0005 
   
 
We further test the impact of agent goals on average individual utility per transaction by the 
regression equation: 
 
AVG_UTILITY = λ0 + λ1ROLE + λ2EGOAL + λ3MGOAL + λ4DGOAL + ε 
 
where AVG_UTILITY is the kth replication’s average individual utility, IU(b, s)k, for b, s ∈  G, 
ROLE is the buyer (seller) if IU stands for the buyer’s (seller’s) IU, and EGOAL, MGOAL and 
DGOAL are the dummy variables to represent agents with easy, moderate and difficult goal, 
respectively.  Agents with non-specific goal are coded as 0 for all three goal dummy variables.  
This means that there are 2400 values of buyer’s IUs (= 150 x 16 treatments) and 2400 values of 
seller’s IUs.  We find the regression equation as 
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AVG_UTILITY = 0.660 – 0.0279ROLE + 0.131EGOAL + 0.166MGOAL + 0.140DGOAL + ε 
                       (p < 0.0005)    (p < 0.0005)        (p < 0.0005)       (p < 0.0005) 
 
The equation is significant (p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.270), and EGOAL, MGOAL, and DGOAL 
dummy variables are found to be positive and significant.  The value of R2 is low in this 
equation, because of the impasse when agents are assigned difficult goals.  Since agents receive 
zero utilities when agents fail to reach agreements, but achieve high utilities if they succeed, IU 
has a weak linear dependence on goal difficulty, when agents have difficult goals.  This is why 




Hypothesis G4. (Self and Competitor Goals have Positive and Additive Effects on Joint Utility) 
We test this hypothesis by the regression equation: 
 
JOINT_UTILITY = λ0 + λ0BGOAL + λ0SGOAL + λ0GOAL_INT + ε 
 
where JOINT_UTILITY is the kth replication’s average joint utility, JU(b, s)k, for b, s ∈  G, 
GOAL_INT represents the interaction between the buying agent’s goal and the selling agent’s 
goal, and others are defined in the same way as before.  There are 2400 values of JUs (= 150 x 
16 treatments), and the equation is given by: 
 
JOINT_UTILITY = 0.721 + 0.259BGOAL + 0.303SGOAL – 0.0987GOAL_INT + ε 
    (p < 0.0005)        (p < 0.0005)          (p < 0.0005) 
 
The equation is significant (p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.415), and the coefficients of BGOAL and 
SGOAL dummy variables are found to be significant and positive.  This proposition is 
supported. 
 
Hypothesis G5.  (In Homogeneous Goal Conditions, Highest JU is with Moderate-Moderate 
Treatment) To test this hypothesis, we compare the joint utilities among the four treatments 
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having homogeneous goal conditions.  The results are presented in Table 9.5.  We observe that in 
homogeneous goal conditions, the joint utilities are the highest when both parties have moderate 
goals.  By conducting t-tests, we see that the joint utilities of agreements made at moderate-
moderate goal condition are significantly higher (M = 1.6458) than those made at non-specific-
non-specific goal condition (M = 1.1115, p < 0.0005), easy-easy goal condition (M = 1.5403, p < 
0.0005), and difficult-difficult goal condition (M = 1.1178, p < 0.0005).  Overall, this hypothesis 
is supported. 
 






(when compared with moderate-moderate goal condition) 
No Goal vs. No Goal 
 
1.1115 < 0.0005 
Easy vs. Easy 
 
1.5403 < 0.0005 
Moderate vs Moderate 
 
1.6458 -- 
Difficult vs Difficult 
 
1.1178 < 0.0005 
 
Hypothesis G6.  (In Disparate Goal Conditions, Highest JU is with Moderate-Difficult 
Treatment) There are 6 different disparate goal conditions in Table 9.1, and they are: 
 
Non-Specific vs. Easy:  {(b, s) | b = Non-Specific, s = Easy}    
    {(b, s) | b = Easy, s = Non-Specific}   (9.6a) 
 
Non-Specific vs. Moderate:  {(b, s) | b = Non-Specific, s = Moderate}   
    {(b, s) | b = Moderate, s = Non-Specific}  (9.6b) 
 
Non-Specific vs. Difficult:  {(b, s) | b = Non-Specific, s = Difficult}   
    {(b, s) | b = Difficult, s = Non-Specific}  (9.6c) 
 
Easy vs. Moderate:   {(b, s) | b = Easy, s = Moderate}    
    {(b, s) | b = Moderate, s = Easy}   (9.6d) 
 
Easy vs. Difficult:   {(b, s) | b = Easy, s = Difficult}    
    {(b, s) | b = Difficult, s = Easy}   (9.6e) 
 
Moderate vs. Difficult:  {(b, s) | b = Moderate, s = Difficult}    
    {(b, s) | b = Difficult, s = Moderate}   (9.6f) 
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There are 300 values of JUs (= 150 x 2 treatments) for each of (9.6a) through (9.6f), and the 
average joint utilities for these conditions are presented in Table 9.6. 
 
The highest joint utilities (M = 1.7151) are achieved when the selling agents have a difficult goal 
while the buying agents have a moderate goal.  However, the joint utilities are much lower (M = 
1.5053) when the selling agents have a moderate goal while the buying agents have a difficult 
goal.  We further observe that the joint utilities of the moderate-difficult goal group are only 
significantly higher (M = 1.6102) than those of the non-specific-easy goal group (M = 1.3888, p 
< 0.0005) and those of the non-specific-moderate goal group (M = 1.4904, p < 0.0005).  
However, the joint utilities of the moderate-difficult goal group are significantly lower than those 
of the easy-difficult goal group (M = 1.6703, p < 0.0005).  Furthermore, insignificant difference 
in joint utilities is found between moderate-difficult goal group and non-specific-difficult goal 
group, as well as between moderate-difficult goal and easy-moderate goal group.  Thus, this 
hypothesis is only partially supported. 
 





t-test p-value  
(vs. moderate-difficult goal 
condition) 
t-test p-value  
(vs. easy-difficult goal 
condition) 
 
No Goal vs. Easy 
 
1.3888 < 0.0005 < 0.0005 
No Goal vs. Moderate 
 
1.4904 < 0.0005 < 0.0005 
No Goal vs. Difficult 
 
1.6085 1.000 < 0.0005 
Easy vs. Moderate 
 
1.6006 0.901 < 0.0005 
Easy vs. Difficult 
 
1.6703 < 0.0005 -- 
Moderate vs. Difficult 
 
1.6102 -- < 0.0005 
 
On the other hand, when the easy-difficult goal condition is compared with other disparate goal 
conditions by t-tests, results from Table 9.6 indicate that the joint utilities of the easy-difficult 
goal group are significantly higher than those of the other five disparate goal groups (p < 0.0005 
for all comparisons). 
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Hypothesis G7. (Self and Competitor Goals have Positive and Additive Effects on NT)  We test 
the impact of agent goals on the average number of turns by the regression equation: 
 
AVG_TURNS = λ0 + λ1BGOAL + λ2SGOAL + λ3GOAL_INT + ε 
 
where AVG_TURNS is the kth replication’s average number of turns, NT(b, s)k, for b, s ∈  G, and 
the other variables are defined in the same way as before.  This means that there are 2400 values 
of NTs (= 150 x 16 treatments).  The equation is: 
 
AVG_TURNS = 1.056 + 3.430BGOAL + 3.724SGOAL - 0.780GOAL_INT + ε 
           (p < 0.0005)       (p < 0.0005)        (p < 0.0005) 
 
The equation is significant (p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.736), and the coefficients of both BGOAL and 
SGOAL dummy variables are significant and positive.  Thus, this proposition is supported. 
 
Relative Effects of Goals 
Hypothesis G8. (In Disparate Goal Conditions, IU of More-Difficult-Goal Agents > IU of Less-
Difficult-Goal Agents) We conducted a chi-square test to investigate the significance of the 
difference of the individual utilities between agents with disparate goals.  There are a total of 12 
disparate goal treatments, and a total of 1800 counts in our experiment.  Among 1800 cases, 
there are 1609 cases that support the proposition.  The critical value for the χ2 distribution with 
one degree of freedom and 95% confidence level is 3.84.  The value of χ2 in our experimental 
setting is found to be 1117.07, which is greater than the critical value.  As a result, this 
hypothesis is supported. 
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9.2 Joint Effect of Goal Setting and Learning 
 
Individual Performance 
Hypothesis GL1. (IU of Agents with Learning > IU of Agents without Learning) To test this 
proposition, we compare the individual utilities of learning agents with those of non-learning 
ones.  These agents are given by: 
 
Agents without Learning: {(b, s) | b, s ∈  G}      (9.7) 
Agents with Learning:  {(b, s) | b, s ∈  GL}      (9.8) 
 
There are 4800 values of IUs (= 150 x 32 treatments – 16 without learning and 16 with learning) 
for each of (9.7) and (9.8), in which 2400 values are buyer’s IUs and the other 2400 values are 
seller’s IUs. 
 
We conducted a t-test to compare the individual utilities between agents with and without 
learning.  Results indicate that agents with learning achieve significantly higher individual 
utilities (M = 0.7680) than those without learning (M = 0.7548, p < 0.0005).  We further test the 
impact of agent goals and learning on average individual utility per transaction by the regression 
equation: 
 
AVG_UTILITY = λ0 + λ1ROLE + λ2GOAL + λ3LEARNING + λ4GOAL_LEARNING_INT + ε 
 
where AVG_UTILITY is the kth replication’s average individual utility, IU(b, s)k, for b, s ∈  G ∪  
GL, GOAL represents b(s) for buyers (sellers), LEARNING indicates whether an agent learns or 
not, GOAL_LEARNING_INT is the interaction between goal and learning, and other variables 
are defined in the same way as discussed above.  We find the equation as: 
 
AVG_UTILITY = 0.621 – 0.0271ROLE + 0.05368GOAL + 0.03377LEARNING +           
                                  (p < 0.0005)         (p < 0.0005)              (p < 0.0005)  
                + 0.00821GOAL_LEARNING_INT + ε 
                                (p < 0.0005) 
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The LEARNING variable is found to be significant and positive.  However, we achieve a low 
value of R2.  These are two reasons for this.  First, there is a high impasse rate when both the 
buying and selling agents are assigned difficult goals.  Since agents receive zero utilities when 
agents fail to reach agreements, but achieve high utilities if they succeed, IU has a weak linear 
dependence on goal difficulty, when agents have difficult goals.  Second, agents have different 
concession behaviors in our experiments.  The variation in β has an impact on the agent’s 
negotiation performance.  In sum, this hypothesis is supported. 
 
Hypothesis GL2. (Less-Difficult-Goal Agents have Higher Increase in Utility from Learning) 
First, we investigate if learning can improve individual utilities for agents with different goals. 
We compare the individual utilities between agents with and without learning, when agents have 
different assigned goals.  Agents with learning and different goals are given by: 
 
Non-Specific-Goal Agents   {(b, s) | b = Non-Specific with Learning, s ∈  GL}  for buyer  (9.9a) 
with Learning:                {(b, s) | b ∈  GL, s = Non-Specific with Learning}  for seller  (9.9b) 
 
Easy-Goal Agents              {(b, s) | b = Easy with Learning, s ∈  GL}           for buyer  (9.10a) 
with Learning:                {(b, s) | b ∈  GL, s = Easy with Learning}         for seller  (9.10b) 
 
Moderate-Goal Agents         {(b, s) | b = Moderate with Learning, s ∈  GL}       for buyer   (9.11a) 
with Learning:                {(b, s) | b ∈  GL, s = Moderate with Learning}       for seller   (9.11b) 
 
Difficult-Goal Agents           {(b, s) | b = Difficult with Learning, s ∈  GL}        for buyer   (9.12a) 
with Learning:                {(b, s) | b ∈  GL, s = Difficult with Learning}        for seller    (9.12b) 
 
where each tuple (b, s) in the above equation represents the experimental treatment in Table 9.2.   
 
We conducted t-tests to compare the individual utilities between (9.1a ∪  9.1b) and (9.9a ∪  9.9b), 
(9.3a ∪  9.3b) and (9.10a ∪  9.10b), (9.4a ∪  9.4b) and (9.11a ∪  9.11b), and (9.5a ∪  9.5b) and 
(9.12a ∪  9.12b).  The results are presented in Table 9.7.  We observe that agents with non-
specific goals, easy goals, and moderate goals achieve significantly higher individual utilities 
when they learn.  However, for agents with difficult goals, we do not find any significant 
difference in individual utilities between those without learning and those with learning. 
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Table 9.7. Effect of Learning on Individual Utilities at Different Goals. 
Individual Utility Goal 
Without Learning With Learning 
 




0.6456 0.6709 0.0254 < 0.0005 
Easy 
 
0.7764 0.7928 0.0164 < 0.0005 
Moderate 
 
0.8118 0.8235 0.0117 < 0.0005 
Difficult 
 
0.7854 0.7849 -0.0004 0.950 
 
Next, we test if the increases in utilities are different among the goal conditions.  We conducted 
a 2 x 4 two-way ANOVA test that consists of agents with and without learning at four different 
goal conditions.  We compare the increases in individual utilities between (9.1a ∪  9.1b) and 
(9.9a ∪  9.9b), (9.3a ∪  9.3b) and (9.10a ∪  9.10b), (9.4a ∪  9.4b) and (9.11a ∪  9.11b), and (9.5a 
∪  9.5b) and (9.12a ∪  9.12b).  The results are presented in Figure 9.1, which shows an interaction 
effect between goal difficulty and learning. 
 
According to Figure 9.1, when agents learn, agents with non-specific goals achieve higher 
increases in individual utility (M = 0.0254) than those with easy goals, moderate goals and 
difficult goals (M = 0.0164, M = 0.0117, M = -0.0004 respectively).  We observe that learning 
provides a higher increase in individual utility for agents with less difficult goals, as compared to 








































Figure 9.1. Interaction Effect of Goal Setting and Learning on Individual Utility. 
 
 
Hypothesis GL3. (When Agents Learn, IU of More-Difficult-Goal Agents > IU of Less-Difficult-
Goal Agents) To test this hypothesis, we compare the individual utilities among agents with easy 
goals and learning (9.10a ∪  9.10b), agents with moderate goals and learning (9.11a ∪  9.11b), 
and agents with difficult goals and learning (9.12a ∪  9.12b).  This comparison is also done by 
including the difficult-difficult treatment from (9.12a ∪  9.12b) in one case, and excluding it in 
another case.  The results are presented in Tables 9.8 and 9.9. 
 
Table 9.8. Individual Utilities of Agents with Different Goals in Learning Environment. 
Situation Agent’s Goal Individual 
Utility 




Moderate 0.8235 All Treatments 
Difficult 0.7849 
< 0.0005 
    
Easy 0.7928 
Moderate 0.8235 
All Treatments except Difficult-
Difficult Goal treatment 
Difficult 0.8608 
< 0.0005 





Table 9.9. Post-hoc Results for Individual Utilities of Agents with Different Goals in 
Learning Environment. 
Situation Goal Comparison 
 
p-value 
Easy vs. Moderate < 0.0005 
Easy vs. Difficult 0.281 All Treatments 
Moderate vs. Difficult < 0.0005 
   
Easy vs. Moderate < 0.0005 
Easy vs. Difficult < 0.0005 
All Treatments except Difficult-
Difficult Goal treatment 
Moderate vs. Difficult < 0.0005 
   
 
When the treatment consisting of difficult-difficult goal condition is taken into account, results 
indicate that when agents learn, the individual utilities of agents with moderate goals (M = 
0.8235) are significantly higher than those of agents with easy goals (M = 0.7928, p < 0.0005), 
but the individual utilities of agents with difficult goals (M = 0.7849) are significantly lower than 
those of agents with moderate goals (M = 0.7928, p < 0.0005).  In addition, there is no significant 
difference in individual utilities between agents with easy and difficult goals.  Based on this 
finding, this hypothesis is only partially supported. 
 
However, when the difficult-difficult treatment is taken out, this hypothesis is supported.  Results 
from Tables 9.8 and 9.9 indicate that when agents learn, agents with difficult goals achieve 
significantly higher individual utilities (M = 0.8608) than agents with moderate goals (M = 
0.8235, p < 0.0005), while agents with moderate goals achieve significantly higher individual 
utilities than agents with easy goals (M = 0.7928, p < 0.0005). 
 
Dyadic Performance 
Hypothesis GL4. (JU of Agreements with Learning > JU of Agreements without Learning) To 
test this proposition, we conducted a t-test to compare the joint utilities of 16 experimental 
treatments in Table 9.1 with those of 16 experimental treatments in Table 9.2.  They are given by 
the JU(b, s)k for b, s ∈  G, and the JU(b, s)k for b, s ∈  GL.  Results indicate that the joint utilities 
of dyads with learning are significantly higher (M = 1.5361) than those of dyads without learning 





9.3.1 Effect of Goal Setting 
A summary of the results of the effect of goal setting on electronic negotiation outcome is 
presented in Table 9.10, wherein the shaded portion indicates hypotheses that are not fully 
supported.  Generally, agents with specific goals perform better than those with non-specific 
goals.  Moreover, agents with more difficult goals achieve higher individual utilities than those 
with less difficult goals.  However, lower performance is achieved when both parties have 
difficult goals, because of a high impasse rate.  Since the impasse rate has a positive and linear 
dependence on goal difficulty, we recommend agents to be assigned goals, but they should not 
be assigned difficult goals in all cases. 
 
To approach highly integrative agreements, we need to consider the goals of both parties.  In 
homogeneous goal conditions, joint utilities are the highest when both agents have moderate 
goals.  Difficult-difficult goal combination is not recommended.  In heterogeneous goal 
conditions, our results are only partially consistent with the findings from Huber & Neale (1986), 
because of the differences in payoff tables between the buying and the selling agents.  To 
compute the utilities, buying agents incorporate the values of both the negotiating and the non-
negotiating issues, while selling agents consider the negotiating issues only.  There is only one 
type of product for buying agents to choose, while selling agents can sell their products to any 
buying agent.  Thus, a same value of final threshold for both a buying and a selling agent means 
that achieving certain utility level is more difficult for the buying agent than for the selling agent.  
This is also the reason why the goals of buying agents have a greater impact than the goals of 
selling agents on the impasse rates.  As a result, when buying agents have difficult goals, 
assigning easy goals to selling agents can maximize the joint utilities of the agreements.  On the 
other hand, when selling agents have difficult goals, we can make the agreements to be more 
integrative by assigning moderate goals to buying agents. 
 
Although agents with more difficult goals achieve higher individual utilities than those with less 
difficult goals, longer time is required to reach agreements.  Thus, the trade-off between 
performance and time is a considerable factor, when we assign goals to negotiation agents. 
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Table 9.10. Summary of the Effects of Goal Setting on Electronic Negotiation Outcome. 






G1 Impasse rate has a positive and 
linear dependence on goal difficulty. 
 
Supported Pruitt (1981) None 
G2 Agents with specific goals will have 
higher individual utilities than those 
with non-specific goals. 
 
Supported Huber & Neale 
(1986) 
None 
G3 Individual utility has a positive and 








Huber & Neale 
(1987) 




G4 The assigned goals of both agents 
will have a positive and additive 
effect on joint utility. 
 
Supported Huber & Neale 
(1986) 
None 
G5 When agent goals are homogeneous, 
joint utility will be the highest when 
both agents have moderate goals. 
 
Supported Huber & Neale 
(1986) 
None 
G6 When agent goals are disparate, 
joint utility will be the highest when 
one agent has a difficult goal and 




Huber & Neale 
(1986) 
None 
G7 The assigned goals of both agents 
will have a positive and additive 
effect on the time to reach 
agreements. 
 
Supported Pruitt (1981) None 
G8 When goals are disparate between 
two agents in a negotiation, the 
agent with the more difficult goals 
will achieve higher individual utility 
than the one with the less difficult 
goals. 




9.3.2 Joint Effect of Goal Setting and Learning 
Table 9.11 presents the summary of the results of the joint effect of goal setting and learning on 
electronic negotiation outcome.  Our heuristic algorithms for learning are found to be effective 
for agents with non-specific, easy, and moderate goals.  However, agents with difficult goals do 
not achieve higher individual utilities when they learn.  In addition, when agents learn, 
agreements become more integrative.  In general, learning is beneficial to agents with no goals, 
easy goals or moderate goals, but it is not effective for agents with difficult goals. 
 
We also observe that learning provides a higher increase in individual utility for agents with less 
difficult goals, when compared to agents with more difficult goals.  This implies that learning is 
a more important factor for agents with non-specific and easy goals than for agents with 
moderate and difficult goals for consideration in electronic negotiation.   
 
When learning is implemented and both agents are not assigned difficult goals, we observe that 
agents with more difficult goals achieve higher individual utilities than those with less difficult 
goals.  That is, although we find that learning is effective in improving the individual 
performance of an agent, goal difficulty remains in effect when agents learn.  Thus, assigning 















Table 9.11. Summary of the Joint Effect of Goal Setting and Learning on Electronic 
Negotiation Outcome. 








GL1 Agents with learning will have 
higher individual utilities than 
those without learning. 
 
Supported Zeng & Sycara 
(1998) 




GL2 Learning will provide a higher 
increase in individual utility for 
agents with less difficult goals, as 
compared to agents with more 
difficult goals. 
 
Supported None None 
GL3 When agents learn, the agents 
with more difficult goals will 
achieve higher individual utilities 






GL4 Joint utility with learning will be 
higher than that in negotiation 
without learning. 
 





The broad objective of this thesis is to develop methods for negotiation agents to understand 
their owners’ preferences and to learn their opponents’ behavior, so that a human being’s 
interaction is minimized and negotiation performance can be improved over time.  Research on 
incorporating human factors into negotiation agents is at a preliminary stage.  We attempt to 
make negotiation agents to be more similar to human negotiators, by integrating learning and 
two psychological factors – situational power and goal constraints – into negotiation agents. 
 
Learning an opponent’s negotiation behavior is important, because the expected concession can 
influence a negotiator’s behavior (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982).  The learning algorithms we have 
presented are based on the premise that negotiation experience of opponents is missing.  This is 
in contrast to genetic-algorithm-based learning and Bayesian learning, in both of which agents 
have some prior knowledge and beliefs of their opponents.  With incomplete information about 
an opponent’s concession behavior, we can use an opponent’s initial demand level and 
concession rate as only a guidance.  In this thesis, we have presented heuristic algorithms to 
estimate the parameters of time-dependent tactic, and then to react to the estimates, so as to 
achieve higher performance.  Experimental results indicate that except for agents with difficult 
goals, our heuristic algorithms for learning are effective in improving both individual and dyadic 
performances. 
  
Besides learning, we have presented how AHP can be used to incorporate situational power into 
negotiation agents.  This idea is similar to AHP’s applicability in benchmarking an 
organization’s performance (Forman & Gass, 2001), but it is new to the negotiation context.  
Experimental results indicate that the outcomes in electronic negotiation agree with those 
observed in human negotiation.  Agents with higher power achieve significantly higher 
performance than those with lower power, but take longer time to reach agreements.  The trade-
off between performance and time is a considerable factor, when we integrate situational power 
into electronic negotiation.  Moreover, we find that our learning algorithms are more effective 
for high-power agents than for low-power agents in electronic negotiation. 
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In addition, we have shown how to incorporate goal constraints into negotiation agents by asking 
users to specify threshold values that agents must achieve before concluding the negotiations.  
With the effect of goal constraints on human negotiation as a reference, we achieve consistent 
results in electronic negotiation.  Agents with specific and difficult goals achieve higher 
performance than those with easy or no goals, but attain higher impasse rates, and require longer 
time for reaching agreements.  Thus, negotiators should not assign difficult goals in all cases, 
because there is a higher chance of failing to reach agreements.  Also, as with situational power, 
the trade-off between performance and time must be considered.  Furthermore, for the joint 
effect of learning and goal constraints, we observe that our heuristic algorithms for learning are 
effective for agents with non-specific, easy, and moderate goals.  However, agents with difficult 
goals do not achieve higher performance when they learn.  Learning is a more important factor 
for agents with less difficult goals than those with more difficult goals. 
 
In summary, our work provides three major contributions to the field of information systems and 
electronic-commerce research, in which electronic negotiations are frequently studied.  First, we 
have designed algorithms for learning the time-dependent tactic of an opponent.  Second, we 
have determined that our learning algorithms are beneficial to negotiation agents.  Our third 
contribution, which is relative minor, is to present how learning, situational power and goal 
constraints can be integrated into an agent.  Finally, with the integration of these factors into an 
agent, we have observed that there is a congruence of outcome between human and electronic 
negotiations.  This congruence indicates that our integration methodologies are worthwhile to 
consider. 
 
Several extensions to our study are possible.  First, since one of the objectives of this thesis is to 
assess the level of concurrence between the outcomes from human and electronic negotiations, 
all the settings in our experiments are based on earlier studies on human negotiation.  In our 
experiments, all agents were only allowed to negotiate with a fixed Tmax.  However, different 
users or agents are more likely to have different negotiation time limits in the real world.  
Besides this, other parameters such as Pmin, Pmax and K are going to be varied for different 
people.  To obtain more meaningful results that represent the real-world situation, it is important 
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to conduct further research and experiments with agents having varying values of the above-
mentioned parameters.  This could further validate our findings in other situations. 
 
In addition, our experiments focus on the negotiation of one product whose properties are 
undifferentiable.  In an electronic-commerce business, products from different agents are usually 
similar instead of being exactly the same as one another.  Difference of preferences on similar-
quality products might affect negotiation outcome.  Thus, further experiments involving more 
than one product, but with similar properties, is important to undertake.   
 
Furthermore, McAlister et al. (1986) conducted human negotiation experiment to identify the 
joint effect of situational power and goal constraints.  Their results indicated that for negotiators 
with low power, having moderately difficult goals led to lower performance than having no 
goals.  On the other hand, for negotiators with equal or high power, having moderately difficult 
goals led to higher performance than having no goals.  One aim for the future is to validate this 
joint effect in electronic negotiation. 
 
Finally, in this thesis, we focus on investigating how situational power and goal constraints can 
affect the negotiation behavior of an agent itself.  Besides understanding an owner’s preferences, 
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